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1. Introduction1,2,3,4 
 The Truckers and Turnover Project is a statistical case study of a single large 
trucking firm and its driver employees.  The cooperating firm operates in the largest 
segment of the for-hire trucking industry segment in the United States, the “full 
truckload,” or “TL” segment, in which approximately 800,000 people are employed, 
according to the 2002 Economic Census.  The TL segment has a high-turnover labor 
market for its main employee group, tractor-trailer drivers, and the project is designed to 
address a number of academic and business questions that arise in this setting.  
 One major part of the project matches proprietary personnel and operational data 
to new data collected by the researchers, to create a two-year panel study of a large subset 
of new hires.  The most distinctive innovation of this project component is the data 
collection process, which combines traditional survey instruments with behavioral 
economics experiments.  The survey data include information on demographics, risk and 
loss aversion, time preference, planning, non-verbal IQ, and the MPQ personality profile.  
The data collected by behavioral economics experiments include risk and loss aversion, 
time preferences (discount rates), backward induction, patience, and the preference for 
cooperation in a social dilemma setting.  Subjects will be followed over two years of their 
work lives. Among the major design goals are to discover the extent to which the survey 
and experimental measures are correlated, and whether and how much predictive power, 
with respect to key on-the-job outcome variables, is added by the behavioral measures.  
The panel study of new hires is being carried out against the backdrop of a second 
research component, the development of a more conventional in-depth statistical case 
study of the cooperating firm and its employees.  This component involves constructing 
large historical data sets from fragmented legacy IT sources, and using them to create 
multivariate models of turnover and productivity.  Two main emphases are on the use of 
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survival analysis to model the flow of new employees into and out of employment, and 
on the correct estimation of the tenure-productivity curve for new hires, accounting for 
the selection effects of the high turnover.   
The project is designed to last three and a half years, with the first half-year for 
set up, and then a year for the initial intensive data collection in the panel study of new 
hires, in parallel with the construction of the data sets for the statistical case study, and 
the initial generation of modeling from these data.  Then there will be two years of lower-
intensity work while follow-up data is collected from the participant in the panel study of 
new hires. 
The balance of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 sets the context by 
describing the U.S. trucking industry, and the role of the TL segment within it. Section 3 
discusses the nature of the labor market for TL drivers, and why it has had a high 
turnover equilibrium for about twenty-five years.  Section 4 discusses the nature of the 
research relationship with the cooperating firm, and how it was constructed.  Section 5 
discusses the statistical analysis of historical operational and human resource data from 
the firm.  It has two main subparts; Section 5.1 exhibits preliminary findings on turnover, 
and Section 5.2 does the same for productivity. Section 6 describes the design of the 
panel study of new hires, and has four main subparts.  Section 6.1 describes the context 
of the Project’s use of behavioral economic field experiments.  Section 6.2 covers the 
process by which new students are trained as tractor-trailer drivers, and Section 6.3 
discusses the schedule for the data collection effort at the training school.  Section 6.4 
lists and describes the five data collection activities (three experiments and two survey-
type instruments) that take place during the first two-hour session of each data collection 
event, while Section 6.5 does the same for the six activities (three experiments and three 
survey-type instruments) during the second two-hour section of each data collection 
event.  Section 7 reflects on the implications of the Project for the relevant research 
communities and public policy.  Appendix A lists the project team. 
 
2. The U.S. Trucking Industry 
2.1. Segments within the Industry 
To a casual observer one truck looks much like another, but in fact, the operations 
that provide trucking services in the U.S. are meaningfully differentiated from each other 
on several dimensions.  At the broadest level, trucking operations are broken into private 
carriage versus for-hire carriage, based on a legal relationship: whether the carrier also 
owns the freight (private carriage), or is hauling it for another party (for-hire carriage).5  
In recent years, for-hire carriers, one of which is the focus of the present study, have 
typically operated about one-third of the heavy trucks6 in the overall U.S. fleet, but about 
three-fifths of the total miles run by such vehicles (Burks et al. 2004a).  
For-hire trucking is itself further broken into a number of distinct segments, 
separated along three cross-cutting dimensions.  Within each segment inter-firm 
                                               
5
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6
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competition is significant, but across segments it may be muted, or in some cases even 
absent.  The 2002 quinquennial Economic Census, because of its use of the relatively 
new North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS), which is based on 
production process characteristics, gives a good overview of the structure of the for-hire 
trucking industry at this level of segmentation.  For-hire truck transportation as a whole, 
NAICS category 484, generated $165.56 billion in revenue in 2002, or about 1.56% of 
that year’s GDP.7 
The first broad scale distinction within for-hire trucking is between firms that use 
general purpose equipment (i.e. standard enclosed van trailers) to handle general 
commodities, and those that use specialized equipment to handle special commodities 
(examples of the latter would be refrigerated vans, flatbeds, tank trailers, and various 
other types of specialized equipment).  According to the Economic Census, in 2002 
general freight operations generated $111.60 billion annual revenue (67.4% of the total) 
and specialized freight had $54.01 billion annual revenue (32.6% of the total). A second 
cross-cutting broad scale distinction is between firms that make long distance inter-city 
hauls, and those that specialize in operations in and around a particular metropolitan area.  
In 2002 the Economic Census reports $120.21 billion in annual revenue for long distance 
trucking (72.6% of the total) and $45.35 billion for local hauls (27.4%). 
A third cross-cutting broad scale distinction is based on the size of the typical 
shipment hauled, and this dimension on which firms differ is of particular relevance to 
the present study.  It is easiest to understand this distinction by considering full-truckload 
service in contrast to the other two, less-than-truckload (LTL), and parcel service.  At one 
end of the spectrum are firms like the one providing data for the current study.  The 
archetypal full truckload (TL) carrier sends a driver with a tractor-trailer to a shipper’s 
dock to fill up the trailer with a load, typically weighing from 10,000 to 48,000 pounds.8  
The driver takes the loaded trailer wherever in the U.S. the shipment is destined, and 
unloads at the consignee’s dock.  The driver is then dispatched empty, possibly after 
waiting for a while, to the next location where a full load is available for pick up.  TL 
carriers may use specialized equipment for special commodities, but if they haul general 
commodities they use general purpose equipment to maximize the chance of backhauls.9  
By contrast, both parcel and LTL firms aggregate large numbers of individual 
shipments collected at local terminals by local drivers into full trailer loads, and move 
them between terminal systems on fixed routes.  Parcel carriers handle very small 
shipments (each piece typically being no larger than 150 lbs., with the average nearer to 
50 lbs.), and LTL carriers aggregate medium-sized shipments (widely varying, but with 
average size around 1,000 lbs.).  The Economic Census does not group parcel service 
firms with the for-hire trucking industry, but with air freight carriers.  However, it does 
capture LTL and TL firms within trucking.  In 2002 the TL segment dominated the 
general freight portion of (non-parcel) for-hire trucking, with 67.9% of the total 
employment, and 83.8% of the total revenue.  If the segments of specialized freight that 
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 Calculation by the authors; total GDP is from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic 
Analysis; URL: http://bea.gov/ . 
8
 The variation is because some less dense freight exhausts a trailer's volume at low weight levels, while 
more dense freight hits the weight limit before the volume limit.  
9
 That is, to maximize the chance of picking up a return load from near the point at which a first one is 
delivered.   
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are primarily TL by shipment size are added to the mix,10 then TL’s share of the total 
employment of 1.137 million jumps to 72.8%, and its share of the total revenue of 
$124.50 billion rises to 77.1%.   
 
2.2. Differences in the Type of Competition within Segments 
The differences across the segments in the operational routines needed affect the 
form and intensity of competition within each segment.  Specifically, in the parcel and 
LTL segments, the need for a fixed network of freight re-handling terminals creates an 
entry barrier.11  While competition among parcel and LTL carriers is frequently strong, it 
generally takes place among incumbents.  This is evidenced by the numbers of firms in 
the long distance parcel and LTL segments.  In parcel there are really only four firms 
with full national coverage (UPS, FedEx, DHL, and the USPS).12  There are more LTL 
firms, but the number is still small. The 2002 Economic Census identifies 89 long 
distance general freight LTL firms with five or more establishments, which is the 
minimum number of terminals needed to give significant geographic scope; there are 
only 57 firms with ten or more.   
But in TL there are essentially no entry barriers.  Since TL carriers do not 
normally re-handle freight once it is loaded, they do not typically require terminals, nor 
regular route patterns, for cost-competitive operations.  So a one-truck carrier can cover 
the entire nation, and in doing so is competitive, on a load-by-load basis, with most of the 
services offered by one of the TL-segment’s giants.   When more complex service 
coordination is the key factor in market penetration, small firms can subcontract to third 
party logistics providers.13  And in fact, there is a continual flow into, and out of, the TL 
segment, mostly by firms operating at small to medium scales.  In TL, the 2002 
Economic Census identified 25,831 long distance general freight firms.14  The market 
concentration levels in these two segments also show the differing nature of competition.  
In LTL, the 2002 Economic Census puts the revenue share of the top 4 long distance 
general freight LTL firms at 36.3%, while it calculates the share of the top 4 long 
distance general freight TL firms to be only 14.7%.   
The implication of these facts is that most of TL service is what business analysts 
call a “commodity business,” and what economists call “perfectly competitive.”  As a 
result, the firms “at the margin,” whose choices set prices for the whole market, in TL are 
often not the big players, exploiting economics of scale, but may instead be the small 
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 Essentially, this means adding all specialized freight except household goods moving. 
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 A brand new LTL carrier that wants to serve more than a single metropolitan area must create and 
operate a network that is of minimum size necessary to attract sufficient traffic from shippers with differing 
destination demands, relative to the total shipment flow densities in the geographic area it wishes to serve.  
But such networks exhibit strong economies of density (a combination of both scale and scope 
economies)—at low volumes the average costs are high, but they fall rapidly as volume increases.  The 
expenses of running such a network until a large enough market share is obtained to make the new network 
cost competitive with those of incumbent carriers are non-recoverable (or “sunk”) if the firm exits. And the 
existence of a sunk cost of entry is the classic definition of an entry barrier.   
12
 Local parcel service is easier to enter, and there are many firms of small geographic scope.  
13
 Since a TL carrier can subcontract actual movements in a spot market to owner-operators, it is possible 
for a firm to enter TL for-hire carriage initially with zero trucks. 
14
 Unlike the case of LTL, since TL firms don’t have freight terminal networks, single establishment firms 
can be of national geographic scope, but in fact 997 of these had more than one establishment, which is still 
more firms than in the LTL segment. 
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firms in the competitive fringe of the industry segment. Their pricing is in turn driven 
significantly by the wages drivers in such firms are willing to accept.  Small firms 
generally face more modest wage expectations from their employees than do large ones, 
and they also have the benefit of more personal relationships between owners, managers, 
and drivers.  And owner-operators, who make up a significant subset of the small firms, 
can always choose to pay themselves less in order to get started in the business.  Large 
firms can choose to pay a modest premium above the level set by such firms, because 
they may have cost efficiencies in other areas, and they may be able to maintain a small 
price premium due to offering customers a number of different services in an integrated 
fashion, but if they raise their wages too high they will make their costs uncompetitive.  
This industry structure sets the context for the derived demand for truck drivers in TL 
freight, and the consequent nature of the labor market for TL drivers.   
 
 
3. The Labor Market for TL Drivers 
3.1. Segmented Labor Markets Emerge 
The American Trucking Associations’ (ATA15) quarterly turnover report typically 
shows the average turnover rate at large truckload (TL) motor carriers to be in excess of 
100% per year (ATA Economic & Statistics Group 2005). Driver turnover among these 
carriers is an economically significant  phenomenon—truckload carriers make up the 
largest segment of for-hire motor carriage by employment, with approximately six 
hundred thousand drivers working at any given time (U.S. Census Bureau 2004).16  This 
segment of the universe of for-hire trucking firms emerged into its present form after the 
economic deregulation of 1980, which transformed the structure of the trucking industry.  
Before deregulation, the nature of the entry barriers created by government policies 
resulted in lots of TL output by firms using the LTL-type organization of production, 
with a fixed network of freight handling terminals (Belzer 1995; Burks 1999).  But in the 
post-deregulation period, carriers specialized quite strongly in one or another specific 
shipment size, from the smallest (parcel), through middle-sized shipments (less-than-
truckload, or LTL), to the largest ones (truckload, or TL) (Corsi and Stowers 1991; 
Belzer 1995; Burks et al. 2004b).   
As the truckload industry segment emerged, so did a parallel segmentation of the 
labor market for truck drivers (Belzer 1995; Burks 1999).17  Drivers wanting to enter 
employment at parcel and less-than-truckload carriers generally found job queues,18 
while the labor market for truckload driving jobs began exhibiting high rates of turnover.  
In fact, the labor market in the truckload segment has essentially been in a high-turnover 
equilibrium since soon after the end of the recessions of 1981-82.19  
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 The ATA is a federation of several separate trucking associations.   
16
 The calculation is this: in the 2002 Economic Census TL firms have 72.8% of the total employment of 
1.137 million workers in (non-parcel) trucking, and the usual rule of thumb is that about 75% of the labor 
force employed by a TL firm is made up of drivers, the balance being made up of sales, customer service, 
administrative, and managerial employees.   
17
 In fact, the argument of the second cited work is that the labor market segmentation was itself a 
significant driver of the parallel industry segmentation. 
18
 This was especially at unionized carriers, but was also to some degree at non-union ones.   
19
 It is an indication of the institutionalization of the high-turnover secondary labor market equilibrium in 
TL trucking that the ATA has published its turnover report continuously since 1996.   
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3.2. The TL Driver's Job 
 To understand this situation, we start with a short description of the human capital 
investment needed to become a driver, and then discuss the working conditions 
encountered by the typical driver.  Driving a tractor-trailer requires training for, and 
passing, the state-administered written and driving tests for a commercial driver’s license 
(CDL).  Typically a high-school equivalent level of literacy is required, and training 
begins with at least two weeks mixed between classroom work and in-truck practice.  
This is usually followed by a few days to as much as a few weeks of initial driving 
experience, which is often obtained with an experienced driver riding in the cab as a 
coach, while the trainee is still driving on a “learner’s permit,” before he or she has taken 
the final test for the CDL.  While the CDL test is administered separately by each state, 
as of 1991 they do so under Federal standards for what must be included.  It is comprised 
of both written and driving portions, and the minimum legal age at which it may be taken 
is 21.  Trucking firms generally considered a driver to be satisfactorily experienced after 
a year of work, so the level of human capital required places the job somewhere between 
unskilled and skilled, and it is best labeled as “semi-skilled.”   
Once a driver is licensed, the key problem in retention is generally perceived to be 
the working conditions faced by a tractor-trailer operator in the archetypal long-haul, 
randomly dispatched, 48-state service provided by most TL firms.  In addition to the 
stresses of handling a big rig among swarms of cars, many drivers have very long weekly 
work hours on an irregular schedule.  In one published survey of long haul drivers, 21.9% 
reported working 70 plus hours each week, and two out of three drivers reported working 
60 plus hour weeks (Stephenson and Fox 1996).  Other surveys report similar findings 
(Belman and Monaco 2001).  A survey of long haul drivers in the Midwest found the 
median driver worked 65 hours, with 25% reporting 80 or more hours.  In a 24-hour 
period, the median hours worked was 11, median hours driving 8.5, and median hours in 
non-driving work 2 (Belman et al. 2005).  These hours contrast to those in two industries 
in which there are occupations with similar human capital requirements, manufacturing 
and construction, which had average work weeks of 40.8 and 38.3 hours in 2004, 
respectively (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2002).  
A related issue is that long-haul drivers are often away from home for multiple 
weeks at a time, with little predictability about the date of return.  In the same survey 
previously mentioned, only 20.7% of TL drivers reported that they were home almost 
every day, while 28.7% of drivers in the same study reported being home less often than 
once every two weeks (Stephenson and Fox 1996).  In the survey of drivers from the 
Midwest, the median long haul driver had last been home four days prior to the interview, 
though one-quarter had been away from home ten days or longer (Belman et al., 2005). A 
less tangible issue is that both drivers and firms like to think of CDL holders as 
professionals, in command of a big rig and responsible for its safe operation.  But 
trucking is a service business, and a primary job function of the driver is to make shippers 
and receivers happy.  The implications vary by customer shipping or receiving location, 
but this can place drivers somewhat lower than they might expect on the supply chain 
status hierarchy.   
Of course, not every driver in TL operations faces the same conditions.  The 
foregoing description applies to those “running the system,” or being randomly 
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dispatched across the 48 U.S. states.  Some TL operations are dedicated to the service of 
particular large customers, and drivers in these operations have a more restricted set of 
pickup and delivery locations, more regular schedules on average, and generally enjoy 
more time at home, as well.  And some TL operations move freight between cities via 
trailer-on-flat-car (TOFC) or container–on–flat-car (COFC) intermodal methods.  Drivers 
in these operations usually have regional or local runs to and from intermodal facilities, 
and are often home nightly, or nearly so.   
 Given these facts, a labor economist would expect to observe a “compensating 
differential” built in to the wages of TL drivers that have the worst conditions.  In other 
words, other things equal, TL firms should offer long-haul randomly dispatched drivers a 
higher earnings level than stay-at-home jobs requiring similar human capital, to 
compensate for their poorer working conditions.  But dissatisfaction over wage 
compensation levels is frequently cited as a leading reason for TL driver turnover (Cox 
2004).   
 
3.3. Buying "Effective Labor" 
Perhaps a better way to think of the firm’s decision problem, that captures the 
nature of the driver labor market and the TL driver’s job, is to consider the nature of 
“effective labor” in this context.  For a TL firm this is the application of labor services to 
move trucks to and from geographically specific customer locations on the particular time 
schedule desired by the firm.  There are three main factors that go into the cost of 
effective labor in this setting.  One is the cost of recruiting and training new drivers to 
replace those who leave, to account for the lower productivity of inexperienced drivers, 
and also to account for any growth in business.  A second is the cost of paying 
compensating differentials to drivers with the worst conditions, to slow driver exits.  The 
third is the operational cost of making driver working conditions better.  In response to 
stochastic customer demands, the most efficient allocation of equipment frequently calls 
for irregular schedules, and little time at the driver’s home terminal.  When this is the 
case, making schedules more regular and increasing the driver’s time at home is costly.  
The key point is that these three cost factors can, to a significant degree, be traded 
off against each other, with higher expenditure in one area lowering the expenditure in 
another.  The firm’s goal can then be construed in the standard manner: it is to find the 
cost-minimizing mix of these factors.  Historically, the best thinking among many 
competing TL firms appears to be that spending more on recruiting and training is a 
cheaper way to get the needed units of effective labor than paying more to raise 
compensating wage differentials or improve schedules.20   
 A stable equilibrium characterized by high turnover rates defines what labor 
economists call a "secondary labor market" (Cain 1976; Dickens and Lang 1993).21  The 
persistence of the secondary labor market for drivers in TL trucking since sometime in 
the early 1980s has occasioned much discussion in the trucking industry trade press over 
                                               
20
 There is actually another cost factor in “effective labor” that is non-negligible, the costs of accidents, 
which inexperienced drivers have at a higher rate than do experienced ones.  We do not address that cost in 
this paper.   
21
 Correspondingly, the ATA typically reports turnover rates at LTL firms to be in the 10% to 20% range, 
which makes them roughly equivalent in turnover to non-trucking jobs requiring similar amounts of human 
capital.   
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the years, as well as a number of academic studies (examples include (Casey 1987; 
Griffin et al. 1992; Stephenson and Fox 1996; Griffin and Kalnbach 2002; Beadle 2004)).  
Through the American Trucking Associations the industry has commissioned significant 
analytic efforts to understand the management issues raised by a high turnover business 
model and the long term demographic trends affecting the viability of the model (Gallup 
Organization 1997; ATA Economic & Statistics Group 2005).  The major findings 
suggest that firms are aware of the trade-offs among the components of effective labor, 
and that within this framework firms adjust to changes in the conditions of the demand 
for, and supply of, effective labor.  It appears that as a result, the labor market as a whole 
also adjusts, perhaps with some lags, to such changes.   
A major study done by consultants at Global Insight for the ATA links the supply 
of truck drivers to the supply of labor for semi-skilled jobs in construction, since this type 
of work often represents the next best opportunity for likely truckers.  The labor demands 
in these two industries are driven by significantly different macroeconomic factors.  
During the 1990s, when the derived demand for drivers was high, there was a modest 
premium—truckers’ earnings were an average of 6-7% above a position demanding 
similar levels of human capital in construction.  The downturn of the economy in 2000-
01 created slack in the trucking labor market, but the arrival of low interest rates kept the 
derived demand in construction relatively stronger.  As a result, for a few years the 
average long haul driver could expect to make less than if employed in the construction 
industry.  By 2004 the gap had narrowed, with long haul drivers 1.5% below that of 
construction workers (Global Insight Inc. 2005). These facts suggest that wage levels do 
adjust over time to changes in the balance of labor supply and labor demand, but the 
persistence of the high turnover numbers shows that the levels of compensating 
differential being offered are not sufficient to lower turnover to the levels typical in other 
blue collar jobs.22   
It is well documented that the flows into and out of industry (as well as related 
movements of dissatisfied drivers between firms) represent a substantial cost to firms.  A 
study by the Upper Great Plains Transportation Institute found in 1998 that replacing one 
dry van TL driver conservatively costs $8,234 and the industry wide cost total was 
estimated at nearly $2.8 billion in 1998 dollars (Rodriguez et al. 2000).  The study’s 
authors suggested that this estimate is conservative, but it gives an idea of the magnitude 
of the turnover costs that TL firms must balance against the alternative costs of raising 
wages and/or adjusting operational and dispatching decisions, in order to lower turnover.   
One might well ask whether firms have fully explored the possibilities for trade-
offs among the three factors behind the cost of effective TL labor.  Most firms are 
operating with high turnover costs, and relatively lower costs for compensating 
differentials and operational adjustments that improve driver lifestyles.  Is it possible that 
some large discrete shift along the frontier could move a firm out of a “local cost 
minimum” in this region, to a different local minimum that might be lower in total costs?  
In fact, J.B. Hunt, then the second largest firm in the industry, engaged in a highly 
publicized experiment with switching from a business model with high turnover and 
modest wage costs to one with higher wage costs but lower turnover in 1996.  It took the 
                                               
22
 The Global Insight study used government data that does not distinguish TL from LTL among drivers for 
firms in long distance trucking, but TL drivers make up the predominant share of the categories they 
analyze.  
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portion of its workforce facing the worst conditions (long and irregular dispatches) and 
raised wages by 35%, while at the same time closing down its driver training schools 
(Cullen 1996; Isidore 1997).  The net result was a cut in both turnover and accident rates 
by approximately one-half (Belzer et al. 2002).  However, the long run net financial 
benefits were not as clear (Waxler 1997), most of the other large firms in the industry, 
including the one providing data for the present study, continue to train many of their 
new drivers from scratch, and nearly all TL firms use the high-turnover-modest-pay-
premium model.   
The long run dynamics of driver labor supply and demand are made more 
complex by the growth of the long-haul TL industry.  Between 2004 and 2014, Global 
Insight projects it will grow at a rate of 2.2%, which translates into an additional 320,000 
heavy-duty long-haul new jobs.  This statistic does not include the number of drivers 
needed to replace those who will retire during this time; the industry will need to find an 
estimated 219,000 additional drivers to replace the 1 in 5 drivers who are 55 years old or 
older and are approaching retirement.  Concurrently with an increase in demand for 
drivers, the growth rate of overall U.S. labor force will slow from 1.4% to .5% between 
2005 and 2014 (Global Insight Inc. 2005).  Another challenging trend for the industry is 
that to date Hispanics, who comprise the fastest growing segment in the workforce, 
represent a lower percentage of drivers than they do of the overall labor supply.  It is 
possible that the conjunction of these factors means that a secular trend towards higher 
prices for trucking labor has begun. This in turn could shift the nature of the tradeoffs that 
firms face among the components of effective TL labor, and—along with fuel price 
trends and the limitations on the growth of labor productivity in trucking (Boyer and 
Burks 2007)—it could also dampen the long run growth prospects of the industry 
(Reiskin 2006).   
 
4. Working with the Cooperating Firm 
The cooperating trucking firm is a large company of national geographic scope, 
with divisions that operate in several of the segments of TL trucking, including long-haul 
random dispatch service, dedicated carriage for large customers, and intermodal services.  
By revenue and employment it is among the top one hundred firms in TL.  The firm 
began as a family-owned enterprise in the regulatory era, although it has grown through 
multiple acquisitions, as well as internal expansions, and the original family has not been 
centrally involved in top management for some time.  
Under family control the management culture was stable and effective, but was 
also, by design, relatively inward looking.  It was based on long-term employment 
relationships with managerial and administrative ranks filled with “trucking people,” 
whose careers tended to be built within this single firm. A significant portion of the 
management started as front-line driver supervisors, or in some cases as drivers, and then 
worked their way up.  Managers at the firm tended to learn their skills on the job, and did 
not see much need to look elsewhere, except to service vendors who could provide 
expertise relevant to particular practical business problems, such as targeted marketing 
surveys.   
During the period between deregulation and the end of the twentieth century, the 
firm made many major and critical strategic moves, some of which were quite daring. But 
the decisions leading to these moves were primarily based on the vision and judgment 
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calls of the trucking people in top managerial positions.  There was little thought of broad 
strategic planning in the formal sense.  Early in the new millennium a new CEO, who had 
significant formal training in management-related areas, directed the first exercise in 
formal strategic planning in the firm’s history, following a process recipe provided by a 
major consultancy.  This exercise began to increase the interest within the firm in 
planning as a useful activity, and also increased interest in establishing the analytic 
foundations for planning work.   
 UMM faculty began to work with the firm starting in the fall of 2002, initially on 
a single pilot project in the form of faculty-guided analysis by an advanced undergraduate 
student.  The project was successful, and laid the foundation for an expanding series of 
faculty-guided research projects over the next two years on a variety of topics.  These 
projects operated on a gift-exchange basis: the faculty and students contributed their time 
as teaching and learning functions, and the firm paid out-of-pocket expenses and 
provided access (under appropriate confidentiality restrictions) to proprietary business 
data.  The core of the process involved selecting topics of both business and academic 
interest, and for which advanced undergraduates could provide analyses of business use, 
as well as generating course-level academic output.  By the third year of such projects, 
about twenty students supervised by six different faculty members had done small 
projects on several continuing topics, from the analysis of exit interviews, to some initial 
turnover and productivity analyses, to work on the recruitment and retention of Hispanic 
employees.   
 Within the firm the linchpin of the process was a senior executive who had joined 
the firm from the outside, and who had significant prior experience working fruitfully 
with academics.  He was promoted to responsibility for a number of the aspects of human 
resources and driver training, and moved into his new role just as the firm as a whole was 
opening up internally to the importance of strategic analysis.  From this initial contact 
UMM came to work with several other executives, at similar or higher levels of authority 
and responsibility, on specific projects.   
On the UMM side the linchpin was an industry studies connection: the initial 
supervising faculty member (Burks) worked with the Sloan-funded Trucking Industry 
Program as a doctoral student, and as a post-doctoral fellow.23  This added academic 
depth and polish to trucking industry institutional knowledge he had originally begun 
acquiring in his youth, when he worked as a tractor-trailer driver during the era of 
deregulation, between two bouts in graduate school.  Burks’s background, along with a 
passion for all things trucking-related, gave him credibility with executives, and allowed 
him to guide the UMM side of the relationship so that useful business deliverables always 
accompanied the academic results of interest to faculty and students.   
 On the basis of the relationship constructed through the student projects, Burks 
and a second UMM researcher, biostatistician Jon Anderson, developed a small project 
contractually sponsored by the firm for the summer of 2004.  This project began 
exploring the historical data retained by the firm for strategic purposes, including the 
analysis of the determinants of driver productivity and turnover.  The larger scale design 
of the Truckers and Turnover Project was developed from the starting point provided by 
the results of this project.  Burks, who devoted a sabbatical year to the project, is the 
                                               
23
 Burks was a doctoral student at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst; TIP was then located at the 
University of Michigan, and is now hosted by Georgia Tech. 
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principal organizer, and he has been joined in creating and developing the substantive 
content of the project by the co-authors of the present paper, as well as by a number of 
other colleagues, who are based in several other institutions.24 
 
5. Research Component One: Statistical Case Study of Historical Data 
 Research Component One is a statistical case study of some of the historical 
personnel and operations data of the cooperating trucking firm.  There are three 
interrelated parts to this component.  The first is building the data sets needed for 
analysis, the second is analyzing turnover, and the third is analyzing driver productivity.  
The goal of the first part is to take the many different data and report outputs produced by 
the fragmented legacy IT resources at the firm, and construct from them data sets that 
permit useful strategic and tactical analyses.  Because the firm’s IT investments began in 
the early mainframe era, and those investments were focused primarily on solving 
succeeding generations of practical business problems, the data storage and reporting 
functions at the firm do not lend themselves easily to strategic use.  Data set assembly, 
documentation, and validation are consuming, and will continue to consume, a very large 
part of the project’s resources.   
The goal of the second part is to use survival analysis to map the differences in 
turnover by driver group, to use hazard functions to explore the different time paths of 
exits by driver group, and to use Cox proportional hazard multivariate regression to 
analyze the interaction between the various factors that can affect exits.  The goal of the 
third part is to use panel data multivariate regression models to map the tenure-
productivity curve of new drivers as they gain experience, using a fixed effects variant to 
make a first-order adjustment for the impact of selection on the tenure-productivity 
relationship.  Once the panel data model is sufficiently robust, the estimated fixed effects 
will then be further dissected statistically.   
 A key (proprietary) business deliverable from this part of the project will be the 
assembly of the results of the turnover and productivity models to create an “expected net 
value of human capital” model for the investment in recruiting and training various types 
of drivers, who are utilized in various types of operational settings at the firm.  Central 
academic results are expected to be generated from both the turnover and productivity 
models.  Additionally, the analysis of Research Component Two, the panel study of new 
hires, will be integrated with the results of the analyses from the statistical case study.  
We next briefly describe the challenges and sketch a few pilot findings from the turnover 
and productivity analyses.  
 
5.1. Initial Work on Turnover 
 The proprietary human resource data set used for initial turnover analysis was 
constructed from three distinct initial data files, which share the feature that each record 
provides information on one driver during one calendar week.  The constituent files 
covered different calendar periods, so we utilize the calendar window during which all 
three overlap, September 1, 2001, through March 31, 2005.  The first file, Weekly Hires, 
consists of some of the data elements recorded about a driver during the week he or she is 
hired.  Drivers who are rehired during the calendar window have more than one line in 
this file.  The second file, Weekly Separations, contains information recorded about a 
                                               
24
 A complete list of co-investigators appears in Appendix A.   
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driver during the week that he or she separates from the firm.  Drivers who are rehired 
and who, as a result, also separate more than once during our calendar window, have 
more than one line in this file. The third file, Weekly Employment, consists of one 
observation in each week for each driver employed during that week.  Combining all 
three data sets gives a complete picture, week by week, of flows in, flows out, and who is 
currently working, for the firm.  
 However, there are some important limitations in these data, and a resulting major 
problem with analyzing them. The Weekly Hire and Weekly Separations data files 
contain a number of useful variables, including several key breakout variables, such as 
the driver’s division (e.g. dedicated, intermodal, system) and what kind of prior training 
or experience the driver had when they joined the firm.25  Unfortunately, the Weekly 
Employment data file is missing these key variables.  This means that at the present 
initial stage of the analysis we don’t have this information on the drivers who do not 
experience either a hire or a separation event during our calendar window.  And our 
information is incomplete for drivers who experience only a hire or only a separation 
event.  In particular, the division to which the driver is assigned is known prospectively at 
the time of the hire event.  But it changes later for many drivers, and we only have the 
updated information in the separation event record for that subset that does depart.   
To partially compensate for these problems, we take the following steps.  
Breakout variables that are of interest in the present study are carried forward to all 
observations on a given driver, from that driver’s hiring observation.  This gives us 
reasonably accurate information on the previous trucking industry training or experience 
of each driver (since this is not information that changes with tenure).  It also tells us 
which division of the firm’s operations a new driver is expected to be assigned to at the 
time of hire.  Because the data on the type of work assignment is so noisy after this 
process, and because we would only be able to update it for those who exit, we do not 
pursue specific findings about the impact of the type of work on retention in the present 
analysis.26 
 A further implication of the data limitations is that we restrict ourselves in this 
initial work to the subset of drivers for which we observe a hiring event during our 
calendar window, because we do not have either hire or separation observations for long-
time incumbent employees, and so are missing their key breakout variable values.  Given 
an industry context in which there are large inflows all the time, however, this subgroup 
is of significant independent interest, irrespective of what might be found if a more 
inclusive group could be analyzed.  Also, because we are not confident that we can 
correctly identify all the characteristics of second or later spells of employment, we here 
only examine the first spell of employment during our calendar window, for those drivers 
                                               
25
 Not included, on the other hand, are items such as age, gender, level of formal education, or ethnic 
category.   
26
 We experimented with the following procedure. We flowed the values from the separation observation 
backward, to all prior observations of that particular driver, for the variable recording division to which the 
driver is assigned--for those drivers who have an observed separation only. (This overwrote the forward-
flowed divisional assignment data from the time of hire for those separated drivers for whom we observe 
the hire event.) This gives us improved information on those who separated, but at the cost that noise is 
differentially left in the observations on those who do not separate.  The results were not credible, so we 
abandoned this part of the analysis until further information can be added to the data set.   
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who have more than one observed hiring event.27  These restrictions still leave us with a 
lot of data: we analyze a set of more than one half million observations covering more 
than 5,000 distinct individual drivers, observed during the period from September 1, 
2001, through March 31, 2005.28   
 Our procedure will be to first examine the survival curve for the entire set of 
drivers we consider here, along with the associated hazard function, which exhibits the 
time path of exit risk that gives rise to the survival curve.  Then we will separate out the 
survival curves for discrete subgroups of interest, and test for differences between them, 
and we will also examine the hazard functions for each subgroup for useful insights.  It 
should be noted that our analysis does not distinguish between the possible different 
reasons for separation.  In particular, of the separation events that we observe, 76.4% are 
voluntary quits, while 23.6% are discharges for cause, but our survival curves and hazard 
functions include both.29 
 
5.1.1. Descriptive Results for All First-Hire-Event Employment Spells 
We begin by examining the survival pattern for the first observed employment 
spell of all drivers having a hire-event during our calendar window.  Figure 1 displays the 
central results. The vertical axis indicates the percentage of the population initially 
entering employment that remains after each amount of time on the job, shown on the 
horizontal axis in weeks from the start of employment.   
                                               
27
 This does not prevent us from examining rehires, as a significant number of the first spells we observe 
are of rehired drivers. 
28
 The precise number of drivers and observations is suppressed for confidentiality reasons.  
29
 The primary statistical methodology is survival analysis.  Standard descriptive and analytical methods are 
problematic when the key dependent variable (here, the length of job tenure) is a time period, since ongoing 
spells observed at any given point in time are censored: they continue for an unknown further period.  
Instead, a conditional probability approach is needed, to correctly take into account the statistical 
information contained in censored observations (Kiefer 1988; Cleves et al. 2004) 
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Figure 1: Survival Curve for this Set of Drivers 
Some key qualitative facts emerge from this picture.  First, turnover rates do look 
extremely high.  At 10.1 weeks 25% of the population is gone, 50% have left by 29.1 
weeks (the median survival time), and 75% have departed by 75 weeks.  Second, there is 
a leveling off of departures in the second six months on the job, followed by an 
acceleration at the end of the first year.  This is consistent with the fact that most of the 
trainees observed here who undergo the firm’s full training program sign a contract to 
pay back about half the cost of training (several thousand dollars) if they do not complete 
a year of service after training.  Plus, the job options within trucking are more plentiful 
for drivers with a year of experience.  The surprise, in fact, is that so many new drivers 
leave before the first year is up.  Clearly, these departures cause both the firm and the 
drivers to incur real costs.   
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Figure 2: Hazard Function for this Set of Drivers 
 Further insights may be obtained by examining the hazard function for this group 
of drivers.  The vertical axis indicates the probability of leaving during any particular 
week shown on the horizontal axis, given that the driver made it to the beginning of the 
week.30  Here the differences in risk of departure are shown more clearly.  Exit risk is 
highest at about 6 to 8 weeks, which is approximately when new trainees first pull a load 
by themselves, without the assistance of an instructor-driver in the cab.  Once drivers 
make it past this stage, exit risk declines sharply, until the one-year mark is reached, 
when separation risk spikes to almost the same level as at the beginning.  Drivers who 
make it to the end of two years are essentially self-selected to have a high likelihood of 
turning out to be longer-term employees.   
 
5.1.2. Descriptive Results by Level of Previous Experience or Training 
Drivers who are hired by the cooperating firm arrive with different levels of prior 
training and prior experience.  In Figures 3 and 4, and Table 1, the differing performance 
of these subgroups with respect to retention gives rise to separate survival curves and 
hazard functions.  The best retention is exhibited by the small group (4% of the total) of 
rehires. This can be observed from the fact that their survival curve is well above the 
                                               
30
 Or, to be slightly more careful, the vertical axis shows a “departure rate,” because it is the conditional 
probability just described, divided by the number of analysis-time units contained in each unit on the 
horizontal axis.  In our case the denominator is one, so the rate is also a simple conditional probability.  
Formally, the hazard function is defined to be the ratio of the density of employment duration to the 
employment duration survival function, or ( ) ( ) ( )
f xh x S x= .   
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Figure 3: Survival Curves by Type of Student 
curves of the other subgroups, and is quantified in Table 1.  We can see in the table that 
rehires have the longest time period of any group at which 75% still remain (almost 4 
months), and at which  50% still remain (over 5 years).  Rehires also have a retention 
period for 25% of the starting population that is so long that it cannot be meaningfully 
calculated in our data.  This is not surprising—rehires are the self-selected subset of 
drivers who are not only experienced drivers, but who have worked at least once already 
at the cooperating firm.  Having explored other opportunities, they now choose to return 
to this firm as their best current option.   
The hazard function for these drivers is distinctive, as well.  It shows a modest 
spike in exit probability early, with falling exit risk thereafter, and also a very distinct 
periodicity during the first year, which likely reflects the incentive effects of the firm’s 
quarterly bonus system.  Rehires are eligible for the firm’s quarterly bonus immediately 
upon starting work, and also have experience with the incentive provided by the 
particular bonus system offered by the firm.  The periodicity in the rehire hazard function 
suggests drivers in this group who may consider leaving during the first year are likely to 
wait until they have completed a quarter and have qualified for the bonus, before 
separating. Also noteworthy, and sensible, is that there is no “first-year-effect” spike in 
the rehire hazard rate—this effect in the aggregate hazard function is entirely due to the 
behavior of other subgroups.   
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Next consider experienced drivers.  These are students who have significant levels 
of over-the-road tractor-trailer experience with other employers, before coming to the 
cooperating firm.  Like rehires, they only have to take a refresher training course that 
takes a few  days, instead of the multiple-week basic training course all other drivers new 
to the firm are required to pass.  Their retention performance is not as good as that of the 
rehires, but it is still well above that of the lowest groups, with 75th, 50th, and 25th 
percentile retention periods of 10.4, 29.4, and 98.3 weeks, respectively.  Their hazard 
function shows the usual pattern of an early peak, with later declines, and appears to have 
a muted version of the periodicity seen in rehires.  This would make sense, as 
experienced drivers are eligible for the bonus system immediately, but don’t have as 
much experience with its incentives as rehires.   
 The next item to note is akin to Sherlock Holmes’ famous observation about the 
mysterious behavior of the dog in the night.  The dog didn’t bark when it should have, 
and correspondingly one would expect new students with no prior background of any 
kind in trucking to have different (and in particular, poorer) retention performance than 
experienced drivers.31  But in these data both new students who are learning the industry 
from scratch, and experienced drivers who are new to the cooperating firm, have closely 
similar retention behavior for nearly the first entire year of employment.  New students 
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 The mysterious behavior (in “The Silver Blaze”) was that the dog did not bark when someone removed a 
valuable race horse from the barn, which was a clue to the thief’s identity. 
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actually do slightly better than experienced drivers, near the end of the first year.  At that 
point their hazard function spikes very sharply, and their performance drops below that of 
experienced drivers.  This is likely associated with the facts that their training contracts 
are completed and they then have enough experience to easily switch trucking firms if 
they desire.  Since new students are by far the largest group (73%) of drivers for whom 
we observe a hire event, their behavior is very important in determining that of the entire 
aggregate driver population.  Thus the size of their initial aggregate spike in exit risk, as 
well as that  after a year of service, both strongly shape the aggregate survival curve and 
hazard function.  
As it turns out, a Chi-square statistical test of the significance of the difference in 
overall survival performance between new drivers and those with experience at firms 
other than the one providing the data shows that experienced drivers do better overall, at 
the 5% significance level (p = .018).  But, as Table 1 shows, the effect is all driven by the 
one-year exits of new drivers, and the magnitude of the effect is much smaller than the 
difference between either of these groups and rehires.32  For instance, 50% of the rehire 
group is estimated to still be at work for the cooperating firm 5.48 years after the hire 
event we observe, while for drivers with experience at other firms it is only 6.8 months, 
and for new students it is essentially the same, at 6.9 months.33  At longer durations of 
employment we see a 
modest difference: 
25% of the drivers 
with experience at 
other firms still 
remain at 22.6 
months, while it is 
only 16.9 months for 
the same proportion 
of new drivers.  
Last, consider 
the retention 
performance of the two final groups: drivers with some prior experience, and those with 
some prior training.  Both these groups are identified by the driver recruiting staff at the 
cooperating firm as having some background in trucking, but not enough to qualify the 
student to take only the short training course for fully experienced drivers.  To extend the 
previous allusion, here is a dog barking loudly—these two groups do quite badly, by 
comparison to students wholly new to trucking.  The job tenure lengths for the retention 
of the 75th, 50th, and 25th percentiles of students with limited driving experience is 1.87, 
4.94, and 12.25 months, respectively.  This tells us that only 25% make it to the 
completion of their one-year-service-after-training employment contract; the other 75% 
are incurring a multi-thousand dollar debt in order to leave early.34  Students with only 
                                               
32
 The pairwise differences between rehires and new drivers, and between rehires and experienced drivers, 
are both significant—the Chi-square p-values for Type 1 error are zero to four decimal places. 
33
 The base time unit for the statistical analysis is weeks, so months are everywhere calculated as weeks 
divided by 4.33. 
34
 Except for those who are hired by a rival firm that is willing to pay off their indebtedness—something 
which is known to occur in this labor market.   
 Table 1: Weeks Of Job Tenure by Type of Student 
Estimated Job Tenure in Weeks  Drivers for 
whom a “hire 
event” is 
observed; 
N > 5,000 
Percent 
of 
Drivers 
75% of 
Drivers 
Remaining 
50% of 
Drivers 
Remaining 
25% of 
Drivers 
Remaining 
All Drivers 100% 10.1 27.4 72.1 
Rehire 4% 16.6 284.7 n/a (long) 
Experienced 8% 10.4 29.4 98.3 
New Students 73% 11.1 30.1 73.1 
Ltd Experience 3% 8.1 21.1 53.1 
Prior Training 14% 6.7 18.1 49.1 
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some prior training, but no prior experience, do even worse, with retention periods for the 
75th, 50th, and 25th percentiles of only 1.58, 4.18, and 11.33 months, respectively.  So less 
than one quarter of these students complete their training contracts.  (The difference 
between these two groups is significant by the Chi-square test, at the 5% level (p-value of 
.045.35))   
Why should these students be at the bottom of the performance ranking, when 
normally prior training or experience would be expected to improve retention?  A 
reasonable hypothesis is that it has to do with the distinctive characteristics of a high-
turnover, secondary, labor market.  In this type of market there is always demand for 
drivers at some job or other.  So someone with prior experience of any kind, as well as 
the graduates of any of the many commercial driver training schools, can get some job, as 
long as they have a CDL.  It may not be a very desirable job, but it is possible to 
accumulate experience if one is willing to put up with some of the poorer working 
conditions available in an industry segment known for having poor conditions on 
average.  In this context, coming to the cooperating firm, and being willing to assume the 
debt contract that accompanies the full training program, is a bad signal.  There may be 
many specific reasons outside a prospective driver’s control that lead to such a decision.  
For example, the student could have experienced some kind of family event that stopped 
their prior training before the CDL exam, or caused them to quit a prior job quickly.  But 
on average, students with some prior training or some prior experience are likely either to 
be job switchers who just couldn’t do better for the time being, but who will be looking to 
leave as soon as possible, or to be job candidates who were unsuccessful at someone 
else’s training course, or were otherwise judged inadequate by other firms.  Either of 
these reasons means the student is more likely to depart.   
 
 
5.2. Pilot Work on Productivity 
The pilot work on productivity utilized a different set of data files from the 
cooperating firm than did the turnover work described above.  We began with two data 
files, one containing basic information (especially hire date and separation date, if any) 
on all the drivers who had separated during the period of one year (for example, in some 
of the pilot work we used 2003), and the second, extracted at the end of the that year, 
containing similar information on all currently employed drivers.  Then two separate 
additional files containing demographic information, and racial and ethnic identity from 
voluntary EEOC employee disclosure forms,36 were added.   
Merging these using the internal employee number (“driver number”) as an 
identifier immediately caused problems. It turned out that driver numbers are not unique, 
but are recycled on a regular basis, so we had to delete some duplicate cases that really 
represented different drivers.37  “Hire date,” a key variable for survival analysis also 
turned out to be problematic.  As one might expect in a high-turnover setting, a small but 
                                               
35
 The pairwise differences between either of these groups and any of those with better retention 
performance is highly significant—the Chi-square p-values for Type 1 error are zero to four decimal 
places. 
36
 “EEOC” is the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 
37
 For the pilot work we did not want the responsibility of making use of social security numbers, although 
a secure method for making use of the relevant identification information has been developed for later 
work.  
Page 20 of 50 
significant number of drivers become re-employed, some having as many as four or five 
successive employment spells.  The problem was that drivers gone for less time than 
some threshold (six months at one point, but varied over time) kept their original hire 
date, while those gone longer were assigned a new one.  The latter fact made it 
impossible to distinguish rehires from new drivers with recycled driver numbers.   
 To do a productivity analysis, the key addition to the records already described 
was information from the firm’s payroll records, which provide a week-by-week 
compilation of the items added to (or deducted from) each employee’s pay, with each 
such transaction constituting a line of data.  The taxes and fringe benefit co-pays were in 
a separate data source to which we did not have access, but even so the initial files had as 
many as 44 transactions per driver per pay period, with more than one million lines of 
data per file.  We proceeded to document the different variables that contained coded 
information about the driver’s work assignment and pay structure, consulting subject-
matter experts at the firm regularly.  Each variable could take on multiple values, the 
meanings of which to some degree changed over time as operational needs changed.  In 
addition, we began to document all the meanings of the values of the key variable 
specifying what type of transaction each line of the payroll file contained.  There were 
several hundred distinct values of this variable, including values denoting several 
different types of mileage pay, dozens of types of lump sum pay for specific tasks, 
dozens of types of pay advances and pay deductions, and so on.   
After documentation, we next “rolled up” the payroll file.  We sorted the file by 
driver and pay-week, and then accumulated all the transaction-level information we were 
interested in having on a weekly basis into new variables, so that the last transaction in 
each driver-pay-week record contained cumulative information for the week.  The kinds 
of information in the resulting records included such key items as the total (paid) miles 
and the amount paid for them, the total number of dispatches.  Also included was 
information on various kinds of ancillary activities when they generated a pay 
transaction, such as paid customer stops, pay supplements for very short runs, paid 
maintenance delays, and so on.  The payroll data thus provides a very rich set of 
information about what each driver does during each week.   
However, the payroll file records what drivers are actually paid for, which is in 
general a subset of what they actually do.  So, for instance, the first pickup stop and first 
delivery stop on each loaded dispatch are not separately compensated.  Extra pickup or 
delivery stops are paid when they occur on long-distance random-dispatch loads, but only 
some of the time when they are on a scheduled run dedicated to a particular customer that 
is engineered to have multiple stops. Most drivers are primarily compensated by the mile, 
and these drivers are paid miles for all their dispatches, which normally includes loaded 
miles, plus miles pulling an empty trailer, repositioning for a new load, and also any 
bobtail miles (i.e. without a trailer).  However, drivers generally run more miles than 
those for which they are paid.  Paid miles are based on a least-distance routing algorithm 
which is historically standard in the industry, but which undercounts the actual miles by 
several percent (recent guesstimates by managers at our firm for the average undercount 
range from 4% to 6%).38  Despite these limitations, the payroll data provide a very useful 
starting point for the productivity analysis.39   
                                               
38
 This is in part because the standard algorithms are to and from standard reference points, and given the 
circuity of the road network, this undercounts actual miles on average.  It is also because drivers are 
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Figure 5: Variance! Miles per Week by Week of Driver Tenure. 
 
5.2.1. Descriptive Productivity Results for Inexperienced Long-haul 
Random Dispatch Drivers 
We began our pilot work with a subset of drivers for the years 2002 and 2003.  
The subset is those drivers who were inexperienced at hire (i.e. who had to take the full 
training course offered by the firm), who were assigned to drove solo (as opposed to in a 
team) on long-haul random dispatch runs, and who were in their 5th week to 156th week 
of tenure with the firm.40  This gave us more than 100,000 pay-week observations on  
more than 2,000 drivers.  Examining the key dependent variable, miles per week, we 
observed very high variance (see Figure 5).  In particular, there were negative values and 
also very high positive values.  The former turned out to be due to mistaken pay being 
charged back against a driver’s earnings, and the latter to a small number of drivers from 
the firm’s early days who were permitted to accumulate vacation earnings over several 
                                                                                                                                            
responsible for selecting a practical route for a large loaded tractor-trailer, which is often more circuitous 
than the least-distance version.  In addition, drivers may choose to deviate for other reasons (for example, 
to run on a turnpike where the salt trucks will be out at night in the Pennsylvania mountains in winter, as 
opposed to a non-toll highway on which such services or more uncertain), as long as they don’t exceed 
certain percentage standards for excess miles, and meet delivery schedules. 
39
 For later work it is expected supplemental information will be added from a separate operational events 
data set also maintained by the firm.  It is not the place to start because it has its own limitations, and also 
because it is about an order of magnitude larger than the payroll data set.   
40
 Drivers begin receiving mileage pay when they first pull a load on their own, without a trainer in the 
truck with them, and the earliest this occurs is about the 5 the week.  
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Figure 6: Average Miles per Week, by Week of Tenure, with and 
without Zero-miles W eeks.  
years and were being paid upon retirement.  We decided to trim the extremes, and had to 
choose whether to leave in zero-miles weeks or use only positive-miles ones, and what 
upper bound to use.   
The actual maximum number of miles that a solo driver could legally run during 
this period, given state speed limits and Federal Hours of Service Regulations for 
operators of commercial vehicles was about 4,000 per week.  But during at least part of 
this period, until the practice was ended, some drivers at the firm were paid for their runs 
only after they submitted completed paperwork for each dispatch. This meant that if they 
held their paperwork they could have one (or even two) weeks in a row with zero paid 
miles, and then a week with very high miles. We decided to trim only the negative 
values, leaving zero-miles weeks in, and also trimmed values over 6,500, after looking at 
the distribution of the upper tail.   
Further examination showed that almost 20% of our observations were of zero 
miles pay weeks.  So we first trimmed out all the pay-week observations that were 
associated with any payroll transaction that could exogenously cause the driver to either 
miss work, or be paid on a non-mileage basis.  This included pay weeks with disability 
pay, vacation or holiday pay, salary (sometimes paid to driver-trainers), lump-sum 
training pay, and the like.  Then we discovered that the payroll system was generating 
dummy paychecks for drivers who had separated from the firm, for several weeks after 
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separation when the driver left owing money, e.g. for things like cash pay advances or 
purchases at a store at a company terminal.  When all of these cases were trimmed out, 
we reduced the number of weeks with zero miles substantially, but 6% of our 
observations remained with zero miles per week.   
Figure 6 exhibits a simple descriptive version of the tenure-productivity curve for 
this subset of drivers.  Even after all the trimming, the remaining weeks with zero miles 
affect the mean values quite significantly.  Without zero-miles weeks, the initial increase 
to full productivity is achieved at about nine months, whereas with zero-miles weeks it is 
nearer to a year.  There is a sharp drop in the curve at one year of tenure with zero-miles 
included.  This is undoubtedly related in some way to the fact that drivers with one year 
of experience can more easily switch firms, and also to the fact that most of the drivers in 
this subset, all of whom have taken the firm’s training, assume a debt of several thousand 
dollars for its cost, which is forgiven at the end of a year of service after training is 
completed.41    The balance of the pilot analysis keeps all the zero-miles weeks in the data 
set, but a goal of the full statistical case study is to dig deeper into this phenomenon and 
develop better evidence on whether they all should be included when analyzing 
productivity, or not.  
 
5.2.2. The Impact of Selection on the Tenure-Productivity Curve 
A major goal of the statistical investigation of productivity is to analyze the true 
causal effect of increasing tenure on expected miles per week (the “treatment effect”), 
while accounting for any impact the high turnover rate might have (the “selection 
effect”).  A priori, a  reasonable hypothesis would be that drivers with lower productive 
capacity would be more likely to leave at any given level of tenure.  In order to test this 
hypothesis we start by running a “fixed effects” panel data OLS regression model, with 
total miles per week as the dependent variable.  We use all the independent variables 
from the payroll data set that plausibly measure exogenous factors that affect 
productivity.  These include driver tenure (a linear term and as many higher-order terms 
as prove significant), the number of dispatches (linear term plus those higher-order terms 
that prove significant).  We also include variables such as the number of short-haul pay 
supplements, the number of paid maintenance delays, as well as dummy variables for 
each week of the calendar year (to capture any time-period effects or time trends), and a 
dummy variable for each terminal at which drivers are based (to capture any geographic 
effects of the home base).  We use robust standard errors.  The pilot version of this model 
has an adjusted R2 of .66.   
The fixed effects model constrains the coefficients on all the independent 
variables to be the same across all drivers, but permits each driver to have his or her own 
regression plane intercept, or constant.  This constant, or “fixed effect,” which is 
estimated by the regression, may be thought of as a measure, specific to the model and 
the data, of the degree of “job match” between the driver and his employment at the firm. 
In the context of the model, it is the number of miles which the driver “brings to the job 
each week” (which can be positive or negative), according to the model estimate.  
Allowing this specific flexibility in the regression model provides a statistical adjustment 
for the relative speed with which drivers of high and low job match turn over, in 
                                               
41
 New drivers also earn their first week of paid vacation at this point, but that cannot be the reason for the 
drop in the averages, as those weeks have been removed from the data. 
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predicting the miles each driver will operate per week.  So, we take the predicted values 
from the model and compute the average of these values over each week of tenure on the 
job. These averages, when graphed, produce a “selection-corrected” tenure-productivity 
curve.  In Figure 7 we compare this new tenure-productivity curve with the simple 
descriptive version of the same curve we exhibited in Figure 6.42   
When both curves are level and the selection-corrected tenure-productivity curve 
is below the old curve, the graph suggests that the true effect of tenure on productivity is 
smaller than it appears in the simple descriptive case.  This implies that drivers with poor 
job matches are leaving differentially faster than those with good ones, which is in accord 
with our hypothesis.  By contrast, when the selection-corrected tenure-productivity curve 
is either rising more rapidly than the old curve, or is above it when they are level, it says 
that the true effect of tenure on productivity may be larger than it appears in the simple 
descriptive case. This could imply that drivers with good job matches are leaving 
differentially faster than those with bad ones.  The pilot results shown in Figure 7 clearly 
show that our initial hypothesis is true from about the ninth or tenth month on.  But 
Figure 7 is ambiguous about whether this is also true early in the tenure of new drivers, 
when the firm has its highest rates of separations.  A major goal of the full statistical case 
study is to clarify these pilot results.   
 
 
                                               
42
 Both curves are for the case in which zero-miles weeks that cannot be specifically explained away are 
retained in the data set. 
Figure 7: The Tenure-productivity Curve with (“AvgMiHatFEStd”) 
and without (“AvgTotMiWkW0”) the Fixed Effects Correction for 
Selection. 
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6. Research Component Two: Panel Study of New Hires 
 Research Component Two is a study of 1,069 new driver-trainees who were 
among those recruited by the firm to start their education at a specific training school 
operated by the firm.  The basic design of the panel study is quite straightforward in 
conception, although it is quite labor intensive and costly to carry out. A large amount of 
data is being collected on each driver trainee, starting with an initial contact while each 
was in the first phase of training, and then continuing with follow-up data collections 
over two years of the trainee’s work life at the firm, or until the trainee exits the firm, 
whichever comes first.   
The follow-up data collections include these elements: (1) a follow-up paper survey 
for the driver mailed to his or her home every six months, for two years, as long as they 
stay employed by the firm; (2) an exit survey for the driver mailed to the driver’s home 
soon after their separation, if it occurs during the first two years; (3) a weekly survey with 
two questions sent over the satellite unit to the driver’s truck;43 (4) an initial survey (and 
consent form) for the driver’s spouse or significant other, asking about family/work-life  
issues, and  mailed to the driver’s family soon after the driver entered the study; (5) a 
follow-up survey to the driver’s family mailed every six months up to two years; and (6) 
an exit survey for the driver’s family mailed upon driver separation, if it occurs during 
the first two years.  As subjects are informed as they enter the study, a cash gift of $5 is 
included in each survey mailing, with the goal of increasing the response rate.  Finally, 
the drivers’ on-the-job performance data will be collected as part of future updating of the 
master data files for the turnover and productivity studies of Research Component Two.   
  
6.1. The Use of Behavioral Economic Experiments 
 A central project design goal is to perform a multivariate statistical analysis of the 
relationship between all the factors that are being measured and the success on the job of 
the trainees, where employee success is measured first by the length of time they are 
retained by the firm, and second by their productivity on the job.44  While the researchers 
(and the firm’s managers) start with a number of hypotheses about what might matter in 
predicting each of these outcome variables, this research component is essentially a large-
scale empirical investigation, designed to let the data tell us which factors matter 
statistically, and which do not.  In this regard, it is particularly exciting that we have the 
opportunity to employ both traditional measurement instruments, and a selected set of 
behavioral economic experiments.   
There are many reasons one might have for doing behavioral economic 
experiments in the field.  But one cross-cutting categorization is whether the investigation 
is primarily about treatment effects or about differences in individual characteristics.  A 
treatment effect is exactly what it sounds like: analogously to studying the aggregate 
differences in the symptoms of ill patients who randomly received a specific medical 
treatment, as compared to those who randomly did not, an economic treatment effect is 
                                               
43
 The two questions are: “How happy are you with your job right now?” (Likert scale response), and “How 
many miles do you expect to run next week?” 
44
 The analysis has the potential to be extended to include safety performance, but that is not part of the 
present project.  
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the difference in aggregate behavior across two variants of the experimental setting.45  An 
example is the difference in average transaction prices between traders in a pit market 
and those in a double-auction market, for the same commodity and with the same 
valuations and costs.   
However, simple behavioral economic experiments can also be thought of as 
measurement tools for the characteristics, including the preferences, of individual 
subjects, as argued in Fehr and Camerer (2004).  This is the approach that fits the 
specifics of the institutional setting of the Project.  We anticipate that the results we 
accumulate will provide significant evidence on the relative utility of conventional and 
experimental measures of individual characteristics in predicting on-the-job outcomes, 
and in complementing or substituting for each other.   
One methodological point should be noted.  We plan to look at the relationships 
among the various measures we are collecting on each subject, as there is little evidence 
in the literature on this topic for many of our measures, let alone evidence using the 
subject population from which we are drawing our participants.  If this were our only 
goal it would be important vary the order in which the different measures are 
implemented during the initial data collection, as it is quite possible that order effects 
could be important for some of these relationships.  Order variations are a standard 
feature of many experimental economic designs when individual subjects take part in 
more than one experiment.   
However, since the central design goal of our project is to examine the predictive 
power of the various measures with respect to individual on-the-job outcomes, a 
countervailing methodological need is to present—as nearly as possible—exactly the 
same set of stimuli to each subject, so that the relationship to the outcome variables is 
always the same.  In addition, the complexity of administering the data collection process 
at the field site made it essentially impossible to vary the order, once we found a 
sequence of data collection events that fit the schedule.  For these reasons the sequence of 
measurements in the initial data collection was not varied.   
 The initial data collection process took place on a Saturday in the middle of the 
first two-weeks of the training process for new driver trainees. We next describe the 
training process, to provide context for understanding where the initial data collection fits 
in the new driver’s work life.  
  
6.2. The Driver Training Process 
 The first two weeks of training for every inexperienced driver takes place at one 
of the driver training schools maintained by the firm.  The initial training includes a large 
dose of classroom work in which students are introduced to the firm and learn essential 
facts about the equipment they’ll be operating, the regulations governing commercial 
vehicle operators and operations, map reading and course-plotting, and the safety rules 
and procedures specific to the firm.  It also alternates hands-on training time between 
truck simulators and an actual Class 8 tractor-trailer.46  Trainees first drive bobtail (tractor 
with no trailer), and then with an empty and a loaded trailer, on the school’s property.  
                                               
45
 Of course, one of the key features which makes experimental evidence the scientific gold standard is that 
random assignment to treatment and non-treatment groups means that any causal factors not directly 
controlled for in an effective experimental design wash out of the results, because they equally affect both 
groups.   
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Once the trainee has qualified for a commercial driver’s license learning permit, and is 
judged ready by the instructors, he or she quickly begins driving on the actual roads and 
highways surrounding the school, with a driver-trainer in the right seat of the tractor.  
 The simulators have two purposes.  One is to speed familiarization with the basic 
features and operational characteristics of the Class 8 tractor-trailer.  An example is 
learning how to correctly shift a ten-speed transmission, which requires frequent double-
clutching, coordinated at first by conscious attention to engine RPM’s in comparison to 
road speed, especially for downshifts.  Another basic feature drivers are first exposed to 
in the simulator is how to maneuver around corners on city streets with a rig that is about 
65 feet (just under 20 meters) long, and that includes a trailer that is 53-feet (16.2 meters) 
long.  A second main function of the simulators is to give drivers practice at responding 
to dangerous settings which could never be practiced in real life, such as how to avoid 
going off the road in response to a blow-out on a steering axle tire, first on dry pavement, 
and then on glare ice on a freeway in the middle of car traffic.   
 Trainees who complete the initial two-week training process are officially hired 
by the firm on their date of completion, after passing a basic skills qualification test.  
Once hired, the driver goes back to his or her home base at one of the firm’s terminal 
locations.  While the content of the Commercial Driver’s License exam is federally 
regulated, the exact rules governing driver training vary from state to state.47  So, 
depending on their proficiency level and on the state in which they will be based, trainees 
may also take the CDL exam at the training school, or they may do so later, at a location 
nearer their home base.  Whether they have the CDL yet or are still using a learner’s 
permit, all new drivers have a second training phase, during which the trainee works for 
between one and three more weeks, actually hauling freight from their home base, but 
with a certified driver trainer in the right seat of the tractor.  When the trainer judges the 
trainee ready (and he or she has acquired a CDL), the new driver is assigned a tractor of 
his or her own, and goes to work on their own.   
 As is mentioned above in previous sections, it is typical for the TL carriers that 
train all or most of their new drivers to offer the training on a credit contract.  The 
contract specifies that the trainees assume a debt of several thousand dollars, which is 
approximately the market value of the training. According to the contract the firm 
provides both phases of the training, including access to the classroom, instructors, and 
trucks, plus needed classroom supplies.  For the first phase of training, transportation to 
and from the training school, a hotel room while at training, and lunches during the 
training day are also covered.  The trainee owes no payments on the credit extended as 
long as they stay employed by the firm, and the debt is fully discharged if the trainee 
completes a specific period of service after the point they begin working on their own 
(either one year, at many firms, including this one, or eighteen months at some others).  
                                                                                                                                            
46
 By definition, Class 8 vehicles that can operate on the National Highway System (NHS) have a 
maximum gross vehicle weight (GVW) of between 33,000 lbs. and 80,000 lbs.   The units utilized by most 
truckload carriers, including the cooperating firm, are at the top of this range, and have a maximum GVW 
of 80,000. lbs. (The NHS is a large subset of all U.S. highways designated by the USDOT, on which  
federal size and weight standards prevail.)   
47
 The Commercial Drivers License (CDL) comes in three categories, "Class C" through "Class A,” and for 
freight vehicles are differentiated primarily by the ascending maximum GVW of the trucks the bearer can 
operate. The "Class A" CDL is required to operate Class 8 vehicles on public roads.   
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Trainees who do not complete the period of service, however, become legally liable for 
repayment of the amount of credit extended.   
  
6.3.The Initial Data Collection Process 
The initial data collection process was piloted in October through December, 
2005, and went to full operation on 22 Saturdays during January through August, 2006. 
The school starts a class into the initial two-week training process (described above) 
every week on Sunday (thus two classes are in residence at any given time).  So trainees 
in target classes received a one-page flier advertising the study as part of their orientation 
on their first day at school.  The flier explained the opportunity to take part in the 
University of Minnesota study the next weekend, and that trainees who volunteered could 
expect to earn cash by participating.  At the beginning of the class day on the Saturday of 
data collection, Burks conducted an informed consent process, in which he introduced 
himself as a former driver turned university researcher, and explained the goals and 
procedures of the study to the potential subjects.  The study is governed by the standards 
of the Human Subjects Protection Committee of the University of Minnesota’s 
Institutional Review Board (IRB), so a formal consent document was used which spelled 
out the risks and benefits of taking part in the study.48  
 The data collection at the training school was set up as two two-hour-long blocks, 
spent doing tasks with the researchers, either on computers or with paper and pencil, with 
a short break in between.  Training classes range from 35 to 70 students, and the largest 
group that could be accommodated at one time for data collection was 32 subjects, so 
each class was broken into two groups.  The first group worked with the researchers from 
early to late morning, and the second group from late morning to mid-afternoon.  On data 
collection days the class day was structured so that those potential subjects who chose not 
to take part did not have extra training available, but instead could spend the extra time in 
the break room.  The buses that transport students to and from the hotel bring everyone at 
one time in the early morning, and take everyone back at one time in the afternoon.  
Given the monetary compensation being offered, the relatively low opportunity cost of 
taking part, and the credible guarantee of confidentiality from the University, 91% of the 
trainees offered the opportunity chose to join the study.  Initial data was collected from 
1,069 participants, with complete information on 1,036 of these.49   
 Except for one instrument (the Educational Testing Service’s test of Quantitative 
Literacy, labeled “Numeracy” in our schedule), all the instruments were administered on 
a wireless network provided by the cooperating firm of refurbished Dell notebook 
computers, with a newer Dell notebook as the master controlling computer.  The software 
used was z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007), the toolbox for constructing computer-administered 
economic experiments and surveys developed at the Institute for Empirical Economics at 
                                               
48
 This document included the following key facts: a) the kind of data collection activities involved, both 
initially and later, b) that subjects would receive $20 in initial cash “thank you gifts” for taking part, and 
have the opportunity to earn substantially more, c) that the money paid to them was coming not from the 
firm but from two non-profit foundations, d) that under University rules for protecting research 
participants, the new data collected about them would be kept confidential from everyone except academic 
investigators approved by the IRB, including specifically that it would never be available to their managers 
at the trucking firm, and e) that participation was completely voluntary. 
49
 Due to a programming glitch, one item, Hit 15 Points, has valid information for only 893 subjects.  
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the University of Zürich.50  The data collection took place in a temporary computerized 
experimental economics laboratory that the research team set up in one of the classrooms 
at the training school on the Friday before the data collection dates on Saturdays, and 
which was then removed at the end of the Saturday event.  The team hand-built a set of 
cloth dividers hung from frames adapted from portable garment racks, which were 
installed between all the computer stations in order to separate subjects during the data 
collection. Because the data collection sessions exceeded the endurance of notebook PC 
batteries, extra power outlets were installed in the walls and a set of portable extension 
cords were deployed as part of the laboratory set up.  The wireless network was part of a 
VLAN (virtual local area network) set up by the firm’s IT support personnel under a data 
security agreement approved by the University of Minnesota Human Subjects 
Committee.  The VLAN  separated the computers on which the confidential data was 
being collected from the rest of the firm’s network, and provided secure data storage until 
the initial data collection was complete, and the project moved back to the UMM campus.    
Table 2 shows the time sequence and schedule for the actual data collection event 
of February 25, 2006.  This class of trainees was relatively large, at 59 students.  51 out 
56, or 91%, chose to take part.   
 
 
Table 2: Data Collection Activity Time Allocations 2/25/2006 
    
Start Budgeted Total Informed Consent Process 
Time Time Time   
7:13 7:10 x Start Informed Consent Process 
59 x X      How many people in the room? 
7:29 7:30 0:16 Finish Informed Consent Process 
        
        
Session 1a 
Start Budgeted Total Activity 
Time Time Time   
7:30 7:30 0:09 Check-In 
7:39 7:40 0:04 Information 
7:43 7:42 0:19 Activity 1: Prisoner's Dilemma 
      Computer generated 
      Pay on beliefs for what percentage of people will send $5  
      as person 1, how much person 2 sends if person 1 sends  
      $0, and how much person 2 sends if person 1 sends $5, 
      $1 each 
8:02 8:09 0:39 Activity 2: MPQ 
      No payment 
8:41 8:47 0:12 Activity 3: Risk/Loss Aversion 
      1 Question, #23 
                                               
50
 Because we are running a licensed adaptation of a non-verbal IQ instrument that requires the display of a 
large number of graphics files, each of which is a scanned image of a page with a pattern-matching task, we 
ran a beta version of zTree that was extended to handle graphics files.  Our special thanks to developer Urs 
Fischbacher for providing this new version in time for our project.   
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      Green by drawing out of a bowl 
      Everyone paid for their selection 
8:53 8:58 0:27 Activity 4: Demographics 
      No payment 
X 9:16 X Activity 5: Big Red Button 
      -Computer generated 
X X X Release Participants 
9:09 X X      First person left at this time 
9:20 9:26 X      Last person left at this time 
    
    
Session 2a 
Start Budgeted Total Activity 
Time Time Time   
9:37 9:40 0:08 Check-In 
9:45 9:45 0:02 Information 
9:47 9:47 0:09 Activity 1: Time Preference 
      2 Subjects, #12 and #19 
      1 Question, #18 
9:56 9:57 0:47 Activity 2: IQ 
      Start Time of Test 10:02 
      2 Subjects, #8 and #21 
      Pay $1 for each correct answer 
      Pay on "pre" and "post" beliefs, $2 each 
10:43 10:30 0:25 Activity 3: Numeracy 
      Start Time of Test 10:44 
      2 Subjects, #8 and #18 
      Pay $2 for each correct answer 
      Pay on "pre" and "post" beliefs, $2 each 
11:08 10:55 0:08 Activity 4: Ambiguity 
      1 Question, #7 
      Blue by drawing out of a bowl 
      Everyone paid for their selection 
11:16 11:05 0:12 Activity 5: Hit 15 Points 
      Computer generated 
11:28 11:28 0:12 Activity 6: Risk, Cooperation, Impatience Questions 
      No payment 
X X X Release Participants 
11:35 X X      First person left at this time 
11:40 11:40 X      Last person left at this time 
    
Session 1b 
Start Budgeted Total Activity 
Time Time Time   
12:15 12:30 0:10 Check-In 
12:25 12:40 0:03 Information 
12:28 12:42 0:23 Activity 1: Prisoner's Dilemma 
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      Computer generated 
      Pay on beliefs for what percentage of people will send $5  
      as person 1, how much person 2 sends if person 1 sends  
      $0, and how much person 2 sends if person 1 sends $5, 
      $1 each 
12:51 1:09 0:35 Activity 2: MPQ 
      No payment 
1:34 1:47 0:13 Activity 3: Risk/Loss Aversion 
      1 Question, #21 
      Blue by drawing out of a bowl 
      Everyone paid for their selection 
1:47 1:58 0:32 Activity 4: Demographics 
      No payment 
X 2:16 X Activity 5: Big Red Button 
      -Computer generated 
X X X Release Participants 
2:04 X X      First person left at this time 
2:19 2:26 X      Last person left at this time 
    
    
Session 2b 
Start Budgeted Total Activity 
Time Time Time   
2:25 2:40 0:09 Check-In 
2:34 2:45 0:02 Information 
2:36 2:47 0:11 Activity 1: Time Preference 
      2 Subjects, #17 and #16 
      1 Question, #7 
2:47 2:57 0:39 Activity 2: IQ 
      Start Time of Test 2:53 
      2 Subjects, #17 and #22 
      Pay $1 for each correct answer 
      Pay on "pre" and "post" beliefs, $2 each 
3:26 3:30 0:28 Activity 3: Numeracy 
      Start Time of Test 3:30 
      2 Subjects, #17 and #16 
      Pay $2 for each correct answer 
      Pay on "pre" and "post" beliefs, $2 each 
3:54 3:55 0:11 Activity 4: Ambiguity 
      1 Question, #22 
      Blue by drawing out of a bowl 
      Everyone paid for their selection 
4:05 4:05 0:16 Activity 5: Hit 15 Points 
      Computer generated 
4:21 4:28 0:16 Activity 6: Risk, Cooperation, Impatience Questions 
      No payment 
X X X Release Participants 
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4:29 X X      First person left at this time 
4:37 4:40 X      Last person left at this time 
 
 While it was theoretically possible for a subject to end up with only the initial $20 
“thank you gifts,” we always paid at least a dollar or two more.  The actual payouts 
depended in part on the use of stochastic devices (plastic bowls filled with colored and/or 
numbered poker chips), as described in the account of each data collection activity, 
below.  The average total earnings for the four hour period of the initial data collection 
was $53, with a minimum of $21, and a maximum of $168.  By design we wanted most 
subjects to be pleased about their initial interaction with the researchers, given the follow-
up contacts with them which are called for by the design.   
 The latter fact—that we needed to gain not only the immediate but also the 
longer-term cooperation of our subjects—also affected the protocol for subject behavior 
during the four and a half hour sequence of data events.  With undergraduate students in a 
university experimental economics laboratory, and with a protocol that takes significantly 
less time than the Project’s, it is not hard to ask subjects to be quiet, to not speak to their 
neighbors, to not do other tasks on the computers, and not to read, write, or use cell 
phones or  PDA’s.  In order to provide a neutral setting, this is the behavior requested—
and normally received from—typical student subjects in economic experiments, unless 
the treatment being investigated is one involving changing some aspect of this, such as 
allowing specific types of communication.  We established expectations of our driver-
trainee participants that were similar to this, but found that to receive willing compliance 
we had to allow for participants who finished ahead of others on tasks that took a long 
time to get up and leave the lab setting temporarily.  We did this explicitly during the 
Numeracy instrument, and during the MPQ instrument, when differences in reading 
speed made the differences in completion time especially large, and we also allowed 
participants to read after completion if they were done early.   
 We next turn to a brief description of each item in the sequence of data collection 
events.   
 
6.4. Session 1 Data Collection Events 
The first two-hour block of data collection activities consists of three behavioral 
economic experiments and two more conventional measures.   
 
6.4.1. Prisoner’s Dilemma 
 Our version of this experiment is a sequential and strategic one.  Person 1 (the 
first mover) and Person 2 (the second mover) each are allocated $5.  Person 1 can send 
either $0 or $5 to Person 2, and Person 2 can respond by sending $0, $1, $2, $3, $4, or $5 
back.  All funds sent are doubled by the researchers.  Each subject provides their 
complete strategy in the game: they make both an unconditional decision for the first 
mover role, and a conditional one for the second mover role (first how to respond to 
being sent $0, and second how to respond to being sent $5, doubled to $10.)  Subjects are 
randomly matched and their role selected by the computer, after their decisions.  This is a 
variant of the task used in Burks, Carpenter, and Götte (2006).  
 Before each decision screen, subjects are also asked how they think other 
participants in the room will act in this experiment.  The first question is “What percent 
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Figure 8: Second Mover Strategies in the Sequential 
Prisoners Dilemma 
of the participants 
do you think will 
send their $5 as 
Person 1?” and 
pays $1 if the 
subject is correct 
within plus or 
minus 5%.  The 
second and third 
questions are “If 
Person 1 does not 
send/does send, 
what is the 
average that 
participants in this 
room will send 
back?” and pays 
$1 for each 
question if the 
subject is within 
plus or minus 
$0.25 of the actual average. 
 There will be four main data items of potential interest from this experiment:  first 
mover choices, the estimate of first mover behavior of others, second mover conditional 
choices, and the estimate of the second mover choices of others. We intend to analyze 
what other factors about the participants predict their choices in this experiment, as well 
as use some aspects of their choices as predictors of other experimental responses, and 
also of some kinds of on-the-job behavior.  A potential workplace application is in 
predicting on-the-job cooperation.  The TL driver’s job is relatively individualized, but 
there are two instances in which the data store from Research Component One may in the 
future be augmented to permit the construction of an on-the-job measure of cooperation.   
 One of the benefits of the strategic form of this experiment is that the second 
mover choices provide a fairly clear typing of the respondents, in terms of who is an 
egoist (never sends anything to the first mover), who is a conditional cooperator (sends 
back exactly what the first mover sent), and who is an altruist (always sends everything), 
with some gradations possible for intermediate dollar responses.  As Figure 8 shows, 
participant behavior is varied in this experiment, but "pure" versions of these three 
strategies predominate among second movers (shown by the large circles, which are sized 
proportionally to the number of respondent choices they capture).  The three pure 
strategies make up 61% of the total responses, and most of the rest are intermediate 
responses.  Those responses below and to the right of the 45-degree line fall in the 
"wingnut" category; these participants may have misunderstood the instructions, a 
hypothesis we can test by correlating these responses with some of our measures of 
cognitive performance.  
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MPQ Scores: Reference Sample versus Drivers
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Figure 9: Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire 
Profile of Subjects, with MPQ Reference Population 
6.4.2. Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire (MPQ)  
 The Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire (Patrick et al. 2002), otherwise 
known as the MPQ, is the second measurement instrument.  This is standard personality 
profile, and consists of 
11 different scales that 
represent primary trait 
dimensions: wellbeing, 
social potency, 
achievement, social 
closeness, stress 
reaction, alienation, 
aggression, control, 
harm avoidance, 
traditionalism, and 
absorption.  The short 
version used in the 
study has 154 multiple 
choice questions.  
Almost all of the 154 
questions have the same 
four possible answers: 
“Always True,” “Mostly 
True,” “Mostly False,” 
and “Always False.”  
There is no separate 
payment for this survey.  
 A principal use 
of this scale will be to 
generate a set of control 
variables in regression 
modeling of on-the-job 
outcomes.  We also 
expect to look at how 
the traits defined by the 
MPQ relate to answers to the other survey instruments, and to behavior in the 
experiments.  As Figure 9 shows, the trainee drivers are similar overall to the benchmark 
population presented in Patrick, et alia (Patrick et al. 2002), which is promising given 
that our primary goal is to use the variation across individuals in the components of the 
MPQ.  Some initial hypotheses, for instance, are that high "achievement" orientation 
should be correlated with job success as a TL driver, especially given the incentive pay 
method faced by these drivers.  One noteworthy point is the apparent difference from the 
population in the factor "unlikely virtues.”  The questions in this factor are set up so that 
only someone who is "too good to be true" will have a high score, and the authors of the 
instrument intend it as a check on the truthfulness of the subject's responses.  This MPQ 
factor offers the prospect that we may be able to control for this effect to some degree in 
multivariate analysis by using the unlikely virtues score as a regressor.   
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6.4.3. Risk/Loss Aversion 
In the risk/loss aversion experiment 
there are 24 questions which are divided 
into four blocks of six questions each (see 
table 3).  There are two possible choices for 
each question, an amount of money 
received with certainty, and a 50/50 gamble 
that pays a higher dollar amount if “your 
color” is chosen and a lower dollar amount 
if the “other color” is chosen.  To avoid any 
hint of experimenter control over the 
outcome, subjects choose which color (blue 
or green) is theirs for the random outcomes 
as their last response.   
 Each of the four blocks of six 
questions follows the same format.  In each 
block, the amount for “your color” and the 
“other color” do not change and the amount 
of the “for sure” option increases by $0.50 
per question.  The design is intended to 
identify where the subject crosses over from 
the “for sure” option to the “gamble” 
option, relative to where a risk-neutral 
person would do so.  After all subjects have 
made their decisions, one poker chip is 
drawn by a participant 
which identifies which 
question (1-24) 
everyone will be paid 
on, and then a second 
participant draws a 
colored chip to 
determine whether the 
winning color, for 
subjects who chose the 
gamble on the selected 
question, is green or 
blue.  
 The choice 
blocs overlap the zero 
dollar point in order to 
allow inference about 
the likelihood that the 
implied utility function 
Table 3: Risk/Loss Aversion 
Question For Sure Your Color Other Color 
1 Win $2.00 Win $10.00 Win $2.00 
2 Win $3.00 Win $10.00 Win $2.00 
3 Win $4.00 Win $10.00 Win $2.00 
4 Win $5.00 Win $10.00 Win $2.00 
5 Win $6.00 Win $10.00 Win $2.00 
6 Win $7.00 Win $10.00 Win $2.00 
7 Win $0.00 Win $5.00 Lose $1.00 
8 Win $0.50 Win $5.00 Lose $1.00 
9 Win $1.00 Win $5.00 Lose $1.00 
10 Win $1.50 Win $5.00 Lose $1.00 
11 Win $2.00 Win $5.00 Lose $1.00 
12 Win $2.50 Win $5.00 Lose $1.00 
13 Lose $2.50 Lose $5.00 Win $1.00 
14 Lose $2.00 Lose $5.00 Win $1.00 
15 Lose $1.50 Lose $5.00 Win $1.00 
16 Lose $1.00 Lose $5.00 Win $1.00 
17 Lose $0.50 Lose $5.00 Win $1.00 
18 Lose $0.00 Lose $5.00 Win $1.00 
19 Win $1.00 Win $5.00 Win $1.00 
20 Win $1.50 Win $5.00 Win $1.00 
21 Win $2.00 Win $5.00 Win $1.00 
22 Win $2.50 Win $5.00 Win $1.00 
23 Win $3.00 Win $5.00 Win $1.00 
24 Win $3.50 Win $5.00 Win $1.00 
Page 36 of 50 
has different slopes in the positive and negative domains.  But there is no set of choices 
only in the negative domain because the project is relying on the long-term 
responsiveness of participants, and pilot work showed that a choice block fully in the 
negative domain was perceived as too unfriendly a task 
 Figure 10 shows the distribution of the total number of risky choices for our 
subject pool, and shows that there is significant variation across participants, which is 
desirable for the purpose of using the variations across individuals to predict other 
behavior. Risk aversion and/or loss aversion are potentially key explanatory factors in TL 
firm turnover, since nearly all of each driver’s pay is based on piece rates (cents per mile 
for a fixed number of miles for each dispatch).  Paychecks can vary quite substantially 
from one week to the next, and thus there is a certain level of short run financial risk that 
goes with the job. The question for the study is to what extent this form of experimental 
measurement of financial risk is predictive of the impact of pay fluctuations on driver 
turnover, as compared to things such as survey responses and credit score.   
   
 
6.4.4. Demographics 
 This instrument is a compilation of 37 demographic questions.  The types of 
questions vary, but the areas that are covered include education level, languages, marital 
status, previous job experience, family lifestyle, racial or ethnic identity, country of birth, 
how many people are in the household, household income, and networking done while at 
training.  These questions are mostly multiple choice, with a few numerical answer 
questions as well.  There is no separate payment for completing this demographic 
questionnaire.   
 Figure 11 shows the distribution of ages of the trainee drivers, as compared to the 
distribution among blue collar workers, as computed from the March, 2005 Current 
Population Survey.  The minimum age to acquire the CDL is 21, so there are no new 
trainees that are less than this minimum age.  However, in general the trainee pool is 
similar in distribution to the entire population of blue collar workers in the U.S., albeit 
with a modest shift towards the age range of 21-30.   
 Figure 12 shows the distribution of the highest education level completed among 
the trainee drivers, with the distribution among blue collar workers in the U.S. as a 
comparison.  The minimum literacy requirements for the TL driver job are undoubtedly 
the reason there are very few trainees with very low educational attainment, compared to 
the blue collar workforce in the U.S. It is interesting that the trainee group has a much 
higher proportion of individuals with some college, but possibly a lower proportion with 
a junior college or technical degree, as compared to the population of blue collar workers.  
Given that someone who has acquired some level of useful education in college is over-
qualified for this job, this pattern is consistent with the view that completing a two-year 
degree is indeed correlated with job market success, since fewer of these individuals are 
in our subject pool.  A speculation about the apparently slightly higher proportion of 
four-year-degree holders in the trainee group, as compared to the benchmark, is that these 
are folks with other options who are attracted (at least initially) by the TL driver lifestyle.   
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Figure 11: Distribution of Participant Age with Benchmark 
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Figure 12: Participant Education Levels with Benchmark 
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Figure 13: Clicks to Reduce Waiting Time at a Cost 
 
6.4.5. The Red Button 
This experiment is designed to measure short term impatience.  It is the last data 
collection event in the first of the two two-hour sessions, and it is followed by 10 to 20 
minutes of break time, during which participants can use the restroom, stretch their legs 
and get something from the vending machines if they wish.  It is directly preceded by the 
demographic questionnaire, to which it is linked.  This means that, unlike most of the 
other instruments, subjects do not have to wait until everyone else completes the prior 
activity, but instead each participant can start the red button task as soon as he or she has 
individually completed the demographic questionnaire.  This setup is designed to 
minimize peer effects in the red button task, since each subject will start the task at a 
different time.   
 The red button activity takes exactly ten minutes, and the task is to wait quietly 
until a timer on the task screen counts down from 600 seconds to zero.  As described in 
Section 6.3, during each session subjects are requested in general to either work on the 
task at hand, or wait 
quietly.  We ask that they 
do not to talk to their 
neighbors, nor engage in 
any other activity, such as 
pulling out something to 
read.  During the red 
button task these rules are 
quite strictly enforced.  
Participants are paid $5 if 
they complete the task by 
waiting the full ten 
minutes.  However, 
subjects may choose to 
end this experiment 
earlier if they wish.  Each 
click of a button below 
the countdown clock on 
the computer screen, which 
is labeled “Reduce Waiting Time,” will cut the individual's waiting time--but each click 
also costs them $1.  The first click reduces the waiting time by five minutes; the second 
click reduces the waiting time by three more minutes, and the third click reduces the 
waiting time by an additional two minutes.  Once the timer says zero, no matter how long 
the subject has waited, the he or she is free to get up and leave the room for break time.  
As Figure 13 shows, 29% of the participants clicked at least once.  This is actually lower 
than we aimed for; our initial calibration runs may have led us to set the opportunity cost 
of the first click too high.   
Patience is relevant to quit decisions, and being impatient can lead to poor job 
performance when a significant part of the job involves being able to wait on customer 
docks, and then hurry up when customers are ready.  Being patient in traffic is also a 
relevant job skill.  We expect to investigate the extent to which red button choices will 
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Figure 14: Total Future Choices  
predict impatience on the job, as measured by quit decisions, controlling for prior 
earnings and prior waiting time during the earlier data collection activities.  
 
6.5. Session 2 Data Collection Events 
The second two-hour block of data collection activities contains three behavioral 
economic experiments and three more conventional measures.   
 
6.5.1. Time Preferences 
In this experiment there are 28 questions which are divided into four blocks of 
seven questions each.  There 
are two possible choices for 
each question: a smaller 
amount of money paid 
sooner, and a larger amount 
of money paid later.  Each of 
the four blocks of seven 
questions follows the same 
format.  The amount for the 
higher payoff at a later date 
is always $80 and the amount 
for the lower payoff at an 
earlier time begins at $75 and 
decreases by $5 intervals to 
$45.  The point at which a 
subject switches from the 
later payoff to the earlier one 
(if a switch is made) provides an implicit point estimate of the subject's discount rate over 
that time horizon.   
The time frames are (1) today (Saturday) versus Monday; (2) today versus next 
Thursday; (3) Monday versus Monday plus one week, and (4) Monday, versus Monday 
plus four weeks.  The two matched pairs of time frames are designed to allow subjects 
that have different discount rates for choices with and without a front-end delay, i.e. with 
and without an initial delay for both payments.51  After all subjects have made their 
decisions, a participant draws one poker chip to select which of the 28 questions will be 
activated, and then two poker chips are chosen the same way which identify two of the 
subjects in the session who will be paid for their choices on that question. Payments are, 
of course, made on the dates requested, either in person, or with an official bank check 
mailed in a University of Minnesota envelope.  
As Figure 14 shows, the two modes of the distribution of future choices are at 
zero and all, with a median of 17 future choices out of a possible 28.  There is a wide 
dispersion in individual responses. We expect to examine the relationship between this 
measure and such other measures as non-verbal IQ, risk/loss aversion, and impatience.  
                                               
51
 The contrast between choices in which one option is an immediate payment versus those in which both 
payments involve a delay will permit us to observe "impatience for immediate results", often described in 
the literature as quasi-hyperbolic discounting, if it should appear.  
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Figure 15: Distribution of (adapted) Non-verbal IQ 
Instrument 
And we will investigate the extent to which it adds predictive power to our statistical 
models of quits.  
  
6.5.2. Non-Verbal IQ 
 The IQ instrument used is a computerized adaptation of the Standard Progressive 
Matrices by J.C. Raven (Raven et al. 2000); the authors created the adaptation under 
license from The Psychological Corporation.52  Each question is presented as a graphic 
image.  On top is a large rectangular box containing some kind of a pattern with a piece 
missing out of the lower right hand corner.  On the bottom are six (or eight) possible 
pieces that could be used to complete the image on top.  Each section starts with easy 
images, and gets progressively more difficult. 
The original instrument consists of five sections, each containing 12 questions.  
Our version is not fully comparable to the standard results for the instrument, because we 
are actively administering only the last four sections, due to time constraints.  The 
original is primarily benchmarked in an un-timed format, and we cut our subjects off 
after 31 minutes, having given a warning 3 minutes earlier.53  The simplest way to match 
our data with the untimed reference benchmarks is to note that everyone in our subject 
pool finished the fourth 
section before the 
announcement of a time 
limit.  Our correction is 
then simply to multiply 
our subjects' scores on 
sections 2, 3, and 4 by 
5/3 to scale them up to 
the same range as the 
score for untimed 
subjects doing all five 
sections.54   
 After both verbal 
and written instructions 
and two practice 
questions, subjects fill 
out a “confidence 
question” that asks them 
how they think they will 
do as compared to other 
subjects in the room, by 
placing themselves in the correct quintile of the distribution of scores.  When the Raven’s 
task has been completed, the same confidence question is asked again.  Subjects are paid 
                                               
52
 Pilot work was done with two other instruments, but one had irresolvable licensing issues, and the other 
proved unsuitable for our setting.   The first several administrations of the Raven’s instrument were done 
with paper and pencil, while we arranged the license for the computerized adaptation (used by permission 
of Harcourt Assessment).  
53
 There is one published benchmark from a French subject pool using a 30-minute time limit, but including 
all five sections.  
54
 This approach produces unbiased estimates, at the cost of greater variance.   
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an additional $2 for placing themselves in the correct quintile.  In addition, two subjects 
are randomly chosen to be paid $1 per correct answer, for total possible earnings of $48 
each for their question answers.  Starting at about subject 200, we also began asking 
whether subjects want to find out their own score and the group average, when they 
receive their payout.55   
 Figure 15 shows approximately how our panel compares to a standard benchmark 
population (citizens of Iowa City, IA, in the late 1990’s.)  On a scale of 0 to 60, our 
subject pool has a higher density between 36 and 44, and a lower one from 54 on up.  The 
median for our subjects is about two points lower than that for the benchmark population. 
The distribution looks reasonable compared to groups of workers in other countries 
against which the regular version of the instrument has been benchmarked.  The primary 
use of this measure in the project analysis will be as a control variable in predicting on-
the-job outcomes. But we also expect to look at the relationships between this indicator 
of non-verbal IQ and the other participant characteristics that we measure.  We will also 
examine how IQ, confidence about one’s performance both before and after the task, and 
the desire for full information about one’s performance, are related.  
  
6.5.3. Numeracy (Quantitative Literacy) 
 This instrument is part of the test of adult quantitative literacy from the 
Educational Testing Service.  The full instrument consists of two sections, of which only 
the first section was used here, due to time constraints.  The section is made up of 12 
questions and subjects are given exactly 20 minutes to complete the test.  The test 
requires subjects to be able to add, subtract, compare numbers, compute a percentage, fill 
out a form, and to be able to read and understand a short problem, among other things.   
 As with the non-verbal IQ, after instructions and a brief practice question, 
subjects fill out a “confidence question” that asks them how they think they will do as 
compared to other subjects in the room, by quintiles.  When the numeracy task has been 
completed, the same confidence question is asked again.  Subjects are paid an additional 
$2 for placing themselves in the correct quintile.  Two subjects are randomly chosen to be 
paid $2 per correct answer, for total possible earnings of $24 each for their question 
answers.  In addition, at about subject 200 we began asking whether subjects want to find 
out their own score and the group average, when they receive their payment.56 
                                               
55
 The two selected to be paid for correct answers will learn their score from their payoff, so they will just 
get the average as new information, but these two subjects are selected after this question is asked. 
56
 As with the non-verbal IQ indicator, the two selected to be paid for correct answers will learn their score 
from their payoff, so they will just get the average as new information, but these two subjects are selected 
after this question is asked.   
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Figure 16: Distribution of Numeracy Scores 
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Figure 17:  Ambiguity and Lottery Choice 
 The 
distribution is not 
directly comparable 
to the distribution for 
the full instrument 
(i.e. when both 
sections are 
administered), but we 
appear to be getting 
good dispersion in 
performance (see 
Figure 16).  The mean 
score is 71%.  The 
primary use of this in 
the project analysis 
will be as a control 
variable in predicting 
on-the-job outcomes. 
The job of TL driver 
requires continual application of numeracy skills, e.g. in map reading and route planning, 
or in calculating hours remaining and hours coming available at specific future times, 
under the hours of service regulations for commercial motor vehicle operators.  But we 
also expect to look at the relationships between this indicator of numeracy and the other 
participant characteristics that we measure.  We will also examine how numeracy, 
confidence about one’s performance both before and after the task, and the desire for full 
information about one’s performance are related.  
 
6.5.4. Ambiguity Aversion 
Our ambiguity aversion experiment is identical to the risk/loss aversion 
experiment described above 
in section 6.3.3, except for 
one detail: it is no longer 
known to be a 50/50 gamble 
if the subject chooses the 
uncertain option.  Two blue 
poker chips and two green 
poker chips are placed in the 
bowl from which the winning 
color is drawn, and then out 
of sight of the subjects, six 
more chips are added which 
can be all green, all blue, or 
any mixture thereof.  As a 
result, subjects only know 
that there is at least a 20% 
chance that green will be 
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Figure 18: Success in the Hit 15 Points Game 
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drawn and at least a 20% chance that blue will be drawn.  All other features of the 
experiment are unchanged: there are four panels of six choices each, with the dollar 
values for certain and lottery outcomes as before.  All subjects choose the certain payoff 
of the lottery in each question in each panel, and then which color is theirs for the lottery 
outcomes.   
Figure 17 shows results for the first panel, when the choice is between a fixed 
amount ranging from $2.00 to $7.00, or a lottery with outcomes of $2 or $10.  The 
horizontal axis shows the total number of lotteries chosen in the initial risk/loss aversion 
task, while the vertical axis shows the same total for the ambiguous version.  Participants 
who made the same choices in both cases would be on the 45 degree line.  The size of the 
circles shows the number of participants at each node of the grid, and it is apparent that 
many subjects did change the number of lotteries they selected in widely varying ways.  
We will be looking to see which subjects choose more or fewer risky options, and 
whether their shift, if any, is related to other experimental or survey measures, and to on-
the-job success.   
 
6.5.5. Hit Fifteen Points 
 This is a backward induction, or planning, task, in the form of a small game 
between subject and computer.  The computer and the subject take turns adding points to 
the “points basket,” and during each turn the subject or the computer must add either one, 
two, or three points to the points basket.  The goal is to be the player to add exactly the 
15th point.  The number of points in the points basket at the beginning of the round varies, 
and the computer and participant take turns going first.  The first round is set so as to give 
the subjects an example of how the first stage of backward induction works.. Before each 
decision is made by the 
subject as to what 
number of points they 
want to add to the points 
basket, the subject is 
asked whether he or she 
will win, or the computer 
will win.  The subjects 
are paid $1 for each 
round that they win.   
 Figure 18 shows 
the distribution of scores 
on this task.  The median 
falls between two and 
three correct rounds of 
the game.57 Together 
with numeracy, we 
anticipate that this 
measure will be predictive of on-the-job success, and especially of high versus low 
productivity.  TL truck drivers have to do numerical backward induction every day, to 
                                               
57
 As mentioned earlier, the N is 893 for this task, as we discovered a programming error in the zTree code 
for the game after 176 subjects had already taken part.  
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calculate back from routing and delivery goals that are from a few hours to a few days 
ahead, in order to decide on the optimal course of action in the present.  One regularly-
used application is in figuring out how many hours they have to get to their destination 
and how many hours they are available to drive under the regulations governing the hours 
of service for commercial vehicle operators.   
  
6.5.6. Risk, Impatience, and Cooperation Survey 
 The last instrument used during the Saturday initial data collection events with the 
panel study participants is a list of attitude questions about risk preferences, patience and 
impatience, and cooperation.  It was assembled from a selection of papers in the literature 
that propose various survey-response measures for these characteristics of subjects.  We 
intend these to also be tried out as control variables, in order to see if they are useful, and 
if so, whether they are substitutes or complements to the experimental measures, in 
predicting behavior on other measures, and on-the-job success.   
  
6.6. Other Measures of Interest 
 The applicant information collected by the cooperating firm on trainees provides a 
few other data items of interest.  There is an indicator of whether or not the participant is 
a smoker (whether the trainee requested a hotel room in which smoking is permitted 
during initial training).  This may turn out to be related to risk attitudes.  In addition, 
since the trainees apply for credit for the training contract, the firm is able to supply us 
with a credit score. We want to examine the relationships among our measures of 
risk/loss aversion, ambiguity aversion, time preference, and impatience, on the one hand, 
and the credit score, on the other.  We also are interested in determining whether the 
credit score useful in predicting on-the-job success, and, if so, whether it is a complement 
or substitute for our other measures.   
 
 
7. Some Implications of the Truckers & Turnover Project 
 The present paper has presented the context and design of the Truckers & 
Turnover Project, at a stage when much of the initial data collection has taken place, but 
while follow-up data is still being collected, and before results have become available.  
The proof of this pudding will, of course, be in the eating, when data collection is 
complete and  results are available.  But there are three points that can be made about the 
project at this stage.  The first two are about research methodology, and the third is about 
the policy significance of the subjects of the project.   
 
7.1. For the Industry Studies Community 
 First, for the industry studies research community, the project stands as a kind of 
“proof of concept” for adding behavioral economic experiments to the already rich mix 
of data collection techniques it utilizes. The Sloan Foundation’s website states that the 
Foundation's goal in supporting industry studies is “to build a strong community of 
industry studies scholars who contribute to academia, to industries, and to government." 
Along with an interdisciplinary approach, the defining feature of this work according to 
the Foundation is that "industry studies scholars develop a deep understanding of 
particular industries by grounding their research in direct observation”(2007).  The 
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conventional tools for direct observation range from in-depth participant observation, to 
shorter structured site visits and interviews, to the collection of proprietary internal data 
for statistical analysis.  To this list, the Truckers & Turnover Project prospectively adds 
behavioral economic field experiments.  The key, in addition to having an existing 
cooperative research relationship between academics and firm(s), is to design the 
behavioral experiments to fit the specific institutional and business context. The new data 
collection techniques must both complement more traditional approaches, and also must 
credibly add value, from both an academic and a business standpoint. In this regard the 
essentially individualized production process of TL motor freight is especially suited for 
an initial exploration of the uses of experiments that measure individual characteristics of 
employees.  But one can easily imagine more complex social dilemma experiments being 
applied in teamwork employment settings, for instance.58   
 
7.2. For the Experimental and Behavioral Economics Communities 
 Second, for the behavioral and experimental economics communities, the project 
also stands as a kind of “proof of concept” for the specific manner of applying behavioral 
experiments to the workplace used.  As mentioned above in Section 6.1, there are a wide 
variety of scientific motives for conducting specific types of economic experiments, but 
one large cross-cutting categorization is whether the primary interest is in treatment 
effects or in measuring the characteristics of individual subjects.  The latter is the purpose 
here, in keeping with the goal mentioned in the preceding paragraph about targeting the 
design to the specific institutional context.   
 The laboratory and the field are both relevant sources of empirical data to be used 
in the generation and evaluation of economic theory.  But it is often difficult to translate 
the import of findings from studies in the fully controlled, abstract, and simplified setting 
of the lab directly to the uncontrolled and complex world of real employment relations 
and production processes.  The approach here is close to what Harrison and List (2004) 
call a "framed field experiment,” in which the experiments are similar to those that might 
be done in a lab with student subjects, but are instead conducted in the field setting of the 
driver training school, with new driver-trainees as subjects, so that the framing for the 
(relatively abstract) experimental tasks is provided by these contextual factors.  We 
anticipate finding some new empirical regularities when we examine the ability of our 
experiments to predict on-the-job outcomes, and if so, we will have provided significant 
evidence for their "external validity,” that is, for the ability of the lab measurements we 
use to capture individual characteristics that are important in practice in a specific real 
workplace setting.   
 
7.3. The Larger Significance of Our Subject Pool 
 The last point we want to make is about the economic and human importance of 
the subjects of our study, driver-trainees in the truckload segment of the motor freight 
industry.  Much has been made in the last decade of the growth of the knowledge 
economy and of the role of workers who have the specific education and skills to prosper 
in it.  But what about those who do not fit this description?  In 2005 fully 40% of the U.S. 
workforce had a high school degree or less, and only 29% had a four-year college degree 
                                               
58
 For some promising work along these lines, see the series of papers on fruit pickers in England by 
Bandiera et al. (2005; 2006). 
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or more (Mishel et al. 2006, p. 153).  As the U.S. continues its transition from a 
manufacturing economy to one in which service occupations and service industries 
dominate total employment, non-knowledge service workers will become an increasingly 
important part of the overall picture.  The job of TL tractor-trailer driver is an archetypal 
example of non-knowledge work that is important in the knowledge economy.  
 The U.S. is a geographically large economy, so transportation and distribution 
have always been a key complement to U.S.-based production. And as the international 
trade in goods looms larger and larger in U.S. production and consumption, the more 
essential become the tasks associated with physically transporting traded goods and their 
ingredients here in the U.S.  Unlike some other types of services, the tasks involved in 
physically moving freight here are not subject to direct competition from abroad.  
According to the 2002 quinquennial economic census, trucking is the largest single 
industry in transportation services by employment, and the truckload segment of trucking 
had a headcount of approximately 800,000.  This means that about 600,000 persons are 
TL tractor-trailer drivers at any one time.59  Yet, the American Trucking Associations' 
survey results say that the typical turnover rate at TL firms is at least 50% per year.60  If 
these figures are taken at face value, it means that several hundred thousand people train 
for and try out this job each year, only to leave it within a few months, probably having 
incurred a significant debt for training that most have little hope of repaying.  Our pilot 
findings on turnover at the cooperating firm do not contradict this interpretation of the 
industry facts.   
 In this context a primary goal of the Truckers & Turnover Project is to use the 
best available means to measure the individual characteristics that make for success in 
this job.  We will then ask whether the findings have actionable implications for business 
strategy, and for public policy with respect to the labor market and education.  Clearly, 
improving the match between job and employee by even a small amount would be a real 
improvement in economic circumstances for both firms and employees.  It may even be 
that our findings will help in understanding how and to what extent the nature of these 
jobs can be improved, by quantifying more clearly the costs and benefits of lowering 
turnover.   
 
                                               
59
 By the rule of thumb that drivers make up about 75% of employment at a typical TL firm 
60
 The rate for large carriers typically averages over 100%, but most firms are small, and the rates for this 
group are usually between 50% and 100% per year.  
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8. Appendix A.  The Truckers and Turnover Project Team 
 
Project Organizer:  
1) Stephen Burks, Division of Social Science, University of Minnesota, Morris; 
IZA; and Trucking Industry Program (Georgia Tech) 
 
Project Co-Investigators (each colleague is collaborating on at least one component of the 
project, some on multiple components): 
2) Jon Anderson, Division of Science and Math, University of Minnesota, Morris 
3) Jeffrey Carpenter, Department of Economics, Middlebury College;  IZA; and 
Norms and Preferences Research Network 
4) Andrew Clark, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE (France), 
and IZA  
5) Lorenz Götte, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, and IZA 
6) Aldo Rustichini, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, Twin 
Cities 
7) Kristen Monaco, Department of Economics, California State University at 
Long Beach; and Trucking Industry Program (Georgia Tech) 
8) Augustin Vicard, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE (France) 
 
On-site Research Team Members 2005-06: 
9) Kay Porter, Business Research Manager, Cooperating Firm 
10) Adam Durand, Research Intern (fall, 2005), University of Minnesota, Morris 
11) William Leuthner, Research Intern (spring, 2006), University of Minnesota, 
Morris 
12) Erin Christenson, Research Intern (summer, 2006), University of Minnesota, 
Morris 
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